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ABSTRACT 
  Administrative agencies increasingly enlist the judgment of private 
firms they regulate to achieve public ends. Regulation concerning the 
identification and reduction of risk—from financial, data and 
homeland security risk to the risk of conflicts of interest—increasingly 
mandates broad policy outcomes and accords regulated parties wide 
discretion in deciding how to interpret and achieve them. Yet the 
dominant paradigm of administrative enforcement, monitoring and 
threats of punishment, is ill suited to oversee the sound exercise of 
judgment and discretion. 
  This Article argues that this kind of regulation should be viewed, 
instead, as regulatory “delegation” of the type Congress makes to 
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agencies when it accords them the authority to fill in the details of 
ambiguous statutory mandates. Administrative law’s “delegation” 
paradigm, unlike its “regulation” counterpart, relies on decision 
processes to channel discretion in the service of public goals. 
Informed by the comparative capacities of different institutions, it 
structures delegated decisionmaking to promote rational and 
accountable policy implementation. 
  The Article then applies this administrative law approach to the 
exercise of delegated discretion by regulated firms. Drawing from the 
literature on judgment and decisionmaking in organizations used 
increasingly by corporate law scholars, it suggests that the efficient 
structure of profit-making firms will, in a subset of cases, systemically 
blind decisionmakers to the types of risk and change in which 
regulation is interested, and lead to unaccountable regulatory 
decisions. 
  Finally, I suggest ways in which administrative law might learn 
from recent research on organizational learning that examines how 
decisionmaking in firms can be structured more effectively, to 
incorporate additional accountability tools through regulatory design, 
third-party relationships, and relations between administrative 
agencies and those they regulate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regulators increasingly enlist the judgment of the private firms 
they regulate to achieve public ends. Whether capital markets 
regulation spurred by high-profile fraud, data security and privacy 
replies to information technology abuse, or homeland security 
responses to new global threats, regulatory measures seek to tame 
complex risk by mandating broad policy outcomes, but according 
regulated parties wide discretion in deciding how to interpret and 
achieve them. 
The trend is understandable. Certain complex statutory goals do 
not lend themselves easily to traditional regulatory forms. Risk, in 
particular, arises from the interplay of a variety of factors and 
manifests itself differently in heterogeneous firms. Its regulation, 
therefore, often cannot be boiled down to uniform rules governing 
behavior or mandating particular measurable outcomes.1 Moreover, 
regulators have a poor vantage point for identifying threats on the 
ground. They lack access to private information held by regulated 
firms. And they face the difficulty and cost of monitoring whether the 
internal behavior of any particular firm is likely to achieve desired 
outcomes. 
In these contexts, therefore, administrative agencies identify a 
broad policy goal—“preventing violations” of the securities laws by 
those supervised by broker-dealer firms,2 “protect[ing] the security, 
confidentiality, and integrity of customer information,”3 or “managing 
the risks” of the over-the-counter derivatives trade4—but leave for 
regulated firms the tasks of interpreting the regulatory norm in local 
 
 1. In particular, attempts to regulate risk through uniform rules are either underinclusive 
in their specificity because focusing on a closed set of specified behaviors invariably neglects 
others that might be of greater importance, ignores the systemic interplay between such 
behaviors, and directs the attention of the regulated to factors that may or may not be relevant 
in a particular case, or meaningless in their generality, for example, “Reduce risk 25 percent.” 
 2. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E)(i) (2000). The 
Securities Exchange Act relieves liability for failure to supervise if “there have been established 
procedures, and a system for applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to 
prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other person.” Id. 
 3. 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(a) (2006) (Federal Trade Commission regulations implementing 
§§ 501 and 505(b)(2) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 
6805(b)(2) (2000))). 
 4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-4(a) (2006) (“An OTC derivatives dealer shall establish, 
document, and maintain a system of internal risk management controls to assist it in managing 
the risks associated with its business activities, including market, credit, leverage, liquidity, legal, 
and operational risks.”). 
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context, assessing risk, and determining the appropriate response. 
This Article argues that leaving such tasks to the judgment of 
regulated firms is analogous to Congress’s delegation to agencies, 
through statutory ambiguity, the power to “fill in the details.” 
As administrative law recognizes when it comes to agency 
oversight, it is difficult to regulate the exercise of judgment.5 
Informed by a sophisticated institutional analysis of decisionmaking 
within and between government bodies, therefore, administrative law 
uses procedure and structure to shape agency discretion so that it is 
accountable: agencies must demonstrate to others that they reached 
their decisions consonant with public law values of rationality, 
responsiveness, and reviewability. Administrative law, then, 
“regulates regulators.”6 
In general, however, administrative law’s sophisticated vision of 
organizational decisionmaking ends at the doors of the regulated 
firm. Despite the institutional focus of its examination of regulators, 
administrative law too often conceives of the regulated as unitary 
actors that act rationally and purposefully, best motivated by clearly 
articulated legal requirements, and external incentives and 
monitoring.7 
 
 5. See Paul Seabright, Skill Versus Judgement and the Architecture of Organisations, 
44 EUR. ECON. REV. 856 (2000) (discussing the difficulty in codifying standards for, or even 
monitoring, the exercise of judgment). 
 6. Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of 
Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, Article 4, at 5 (available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4). 
 7. One notable exception is Richard B. Stewart, Organizational Jurisprudence, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 371 (1987) (reviewing MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A 
LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986)), which summarizes and suggests the 
importance of several strains of organizational theory. Legal scholars Timothy Malloy and 
David Spence have also drawn on sophisticated accounts of organizational behavior in their 
analyses of environmental regulation. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the 
Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 457 (2003) (“[V]isions of the firm . . . share a common flaw . . . . 
[T]hey . . . overlook the ways in which the firm’s internal environment can affect managers’ 
decisions . . . . [F]irm behavior is driven more by the firm’s routines than by economic rationality 
or normative values.”); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and 
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 533 (2002) (“[A]ssum[ing] that the organization is a 
monolithic entity that essentially makes decisions as a natural individual would . . . [mean] the 
collective nature of the firm and its internal features are largely ignored.”) (footnotes omitted)); 
David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Rational Actor 
Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 936 (2001) (“[B]ecause environmental 
regulation relies on numerous, fluid, vague, and difficult-to-find rules . . . most noncompliance is 
neither rational nor a choice.”). 
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This approximation of regulated firm behavior might, in many 
instances, work well. In traditional command-and-control regulation, 
or even newer performance-based directives, for example, regulators 
can articulate specific outcomes that are easy to monitor and enforce. 
In such contexts, agencies themselves exercise the discretion left by 
ambiguous statutes, and the inner workings of regulated firms remain 
largely beyond concern. 
Yet as regulators turn to regulation that relies less on specific 
directives and more on judgment within firm boundaries, a stylized 
theory of the firm as a unitary rational actor provides, at best, an 
incomplete account of firm decisionmaking. Firms frequently engage 
in financial misrepresentation when it is irrational for them to do so in 
light of the certainty that their behavior will be discovered.8 Others 
with strong organizational incentives to ensure the accuracy of their 
internal controls badly misestimate their financial and operational 
risk.9 Gatekeepers responsible for the accountability of financial 
systems acquiesce in managerial fraud or misrepresentations, risking 
legal and market sanctions and loss of reputation that far exceeds any 
potential gain. Indeed, the lesson of the investigations into the Enron 
fraud and other contemporary misconduct cases was not that one 
could find individual “bad apples” within companies, but that a 
systemic problem existed. Namely, each of the “watchdogs” in the 
“multilayered system of controls devised to protect the public”—even 
those without ill intentions—failed to assess accurately or stop the 
situation.10 
 
 8. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 101 (1997). 
 9. The notable failure of Long Term Capital Management, for example, resulted from 
systemic underestimation of risk despite its leadership by two Nobel-winning economists, 
threatening its counterparties and lenders and—some believe—debt markets more generally. 
See generally Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (1999). Even in the wake of the Enron scandal, 45.9 
percent of corporate directors surveyed by the Institute of Internal Auditors and the National 
Association of Corporate Directors answered that their organizations had no formal process for 
identifying risk, while 17 percent were “not sure.” After Enron: A Survey for Corporate 
Directors, 1318 PLI/CORP 563, 571 (2002). 
 10. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL 
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 2 (2002) (concluding 
that “[n]ot one of the watchdogs was there to prevent or warn of the impending disaster,” 
including Enron’s Board of Directors, Arthur Andersen (Enron’s auditor), investment banking 
firms, attorneys, Wall Street securities analysts, credit rating agencies, and the SEC). 
01__BAMBERGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:06 PM 
2006] REGULATION AS DELEGATION 383 
These problems, well documented in the financial context, raise 
concern in realms with even higher stakes. Government must, for 
example, rely on the judgment of private actors who own and manage 
most of the nation’s critical infrastructure holdings to identify, assess, 
and mitigate the threats posed by low-probability, high-risk 
occurrences like terrorist threats.11 The advantages of addressing 
compliance shortcomings ex ante, rather than after catastrophic harm, 
are clear. 
Because private firms increasingly exercise regulatory discretion 
of the type delegated to agencies, administrative law should be 
concerned with private firm behavior. In particular, administrative 
law should follow the lead of recent corporate law scholarship, and 
draw on insights from the management and organizational behavior 
literatures to develop a richer account of decisionmaking within the 
corporate “black box” and, accordingly, an understanding of the 
extent to which firms’ exercise of regulatory discretion is, or is not, 
accountable to public norms. 
This Article begins that process. It uses those literatures to 
identify one cluster of accountability problems raised by regulatory 
delegation to private firms. These problems are rooted not in self-
interested calculation about private gain or shortcomings in 
normative commitments to legal compliance, but in the less conscious 
workings of organizational decision processes. Specifically, efficient 
methods of coordinating individuals to achieve firm goals can cause 
predictable decision pathologies that mask the very type of risks and 
dangers targeted by regulation. Thus, these pathologies are especially 
pronounced when regulatory norms cause a drag on efficiency, i.e., 
when those norms are in tension with the core goals around which the 
firm is structured. As a result, the combined choices of even well-
meaning individuals can lead to the exercise of regulatory discretion 
in ways that are not rational, not responsive to legal goals or 
 
 11. “Private industry owns and operates approximately 85 percent of our critical 
infrastructures and key assets.” Larry M. Wortzel, Securing America’s Critical Infrastructures: 
A Top Priority for the Department of Homeland Security, Address at the Conference for 
Critical Infrastructure and Homeland Security: Public Policy Implications for Business (April 
23, 2003), in HERITAGE LECTURES NO. 787, May 7, 2003, at 2, available at http://www.heritage. 
org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/41362_1.pdf. Because of this the government has 
recognized that federal agencies must rely on private companies for the identification of 
homeland security risk and protection of critical assets. JOHN MOTEFF & PAUL PARFOMAK, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY ASSETS: DEFINITION AND 
IDENTIFICATION 6 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL32631.pdf. 
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enforcement efforts, and shielded from review because they result 
from unconscious and invisible routines buried deep within firm 
structures. In this sense, a firm’s “regulatory decisionmaking” can be 
literally arbitrary and capricious, unreviewable, or wholly captured by 
private concern. 
The Article not only frames a critique of administrative law’s 
dominant model of firms, but also suggests a blueprint for thinking 
about ways to ameliorate failures in the exercise of regulatory 
discretion by substituting a paradigm of administrative accountability 
for the traditional model of regulatory compliance. In particular, it 
derives a set of accountability tools from the literature on judgment 
and decisionmaking, and identifies contexts in which promising 
approaches might already exist. These proposals are not intended as 
an exclusive accountability schema for regulated-firm 
decisionmaking; they address only the cognitively-rooted threats to 
good decisionmaking when it is otherwise difficult to measure 
substantive outcomes. Accordingly, they suggest a framework to 
guide agencies in experimenting more generally with integrating 
cognitive understandings into the regulation of decision processes. 
This framework should include regulated firms as part of the 
administrative process. In making this claim, this Article offers an 
additional dimension to scholarship on the role of private actors in 
lawmaking. That scholarship focuses on a combination of 
mechanisms, notably contract and consensus, by which government 
administrators enlist private parties to perform traditionally public 
functions ranging from standard setting to the administration of 
prisons.12 It suggests that privatization, in the language of 
administrative law, is a form of delegation that raises accountability 
concerns.13 By identifying ways in which regulation, too, can 
constitute delegation, I argue that decisions assigned to regulated 
firms should also be viewed through an accountability lens. 
 
 12. See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD (2002); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Private Role] (discussing private role in service 
provision, regulation and incarceration); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the 
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56 (1997) [hereinafter Freeman, Collaborative 
Governance] (describing how a flexible EPA permitting process has allowed private companies 
to devise a more adaptive permitting regime). 
 13. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370–71 
(2003). 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the trend 
toward regulatory delegation and the resulting challenge to the 
dominant paradigm of regulatory “compliance,” by which regulators 
seek to affect the behavior of regulated entities through monitoring 
and incentives. It argues that regulatory delegation is better governed 
by a different model: the accountability paradigm used for structuring 
legislative delegations to administrative agencies. 
Part II presents an account of the way decisions occur within 
firms, and identifies particular accountability problems with firms’ 
exercise of regulatory discretion. More specifically, it describes how 
corporate structures, mindsets, and routines developed to allow 
efficient firm behavior can skew compliance efforts by filtering out 
the very information about risk and change that regulation seeks to 
identify. This filtering can both result in arbitrary or unresponsive 
regulatory decisions, and preclude their meaningful review. 
Part III uses the literature on how organizations learn to develop 
tools for increasing the accountability of regulated firm decisions, and 
suggests three contexts in which they can be implemented. First, it 
argues that those tools can be used in regulatory design to focus the 
attention of individuals within the firm, and therefore prompt them to 
make more rational regulatory decisions. For example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act’s14 expansion of federal securities regulation contains a 
number of provisions with promise as “attention regulation.” Second, 
it explores ways in which relations with third-party monitors might 
better be utilized to overcome cognitive decisionmaking pathologies. 
Finally, this Part suggests a model for reworking the relationship 
between regulators and firms to augment the agency’s role as 
educator. In sum, this Part offers a blueprint for thinking about how 
best to enlist the judgment of private firms—those with the most on-
the-ground information about risk in a variety of contexts—to 
achieve public ends while avoiding pathologies that distort that 
judgment 
I.  REGULATORY DELEGATION 
Regulatory responses to this decade’s high-profile governance 
challenges sound a consistent theme: they blur the customary roles of 
regulators and those who are regulated. Traditionally, public 
 
 14. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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administrative agencies are delegated wide discretion to flesh out 
broad legislative goals. Private parties are in turn regulated by 
provisions mandating their conduct accordingly. Faced with a host of 
contexts in which it is difficult to mandate specific outcomes from 
above, however, regulators increasingly assign to regulated private 
firms important decisions about the definition of those goals and how 
to achieve them. Regulators no longer command, they delegate. 
Private firms are no longer simply regulated; they are often assigned 
discretion to fill in regulatory detail analogous to the type exercised 
by administrative agencies. 
The blurring between regulation and delegation poses a 
challenge to the traditional paradigm for the legal control of 
regulated firm behavior. That paradigm uses traditional mechanisms 
of control—regulatory specificity, monitoring, and incentives—to 
mandate compliance with regulatory commands. When specific 
commands are replaced with regulatory delegation, however, these 
mechanisms are less useful. Because it makes little sense to speak 
about “compliance with” the exercise of decisionmaking discretion, 
such mechanisms often provide only illusory constraints on private 
firm choices, leaving open the possibility that public norms will be 
subverted by private decisions. 
When regulation resembles administrative delegation, then, a 
more useful model for the legal control of regulatory implementation 
is often the web of mechanisms employed to make the bureaucratic 
exercise of delegated authority accountable. The accountability 
paradigm offers a means to glean the benefits of regulatory 
delegation when private actors claim superior information and 
expertise, while at the same time cabining private discretion by 
making firms answerable to others for decisions that should be made 
consistent with substantive public norms. 
A. The Trend Toward Regulatory Delegation 
Traditional regulation seeks to achieve particular outcomes by 
articulating, ex ante, universal rules requiring certain conduct or 
particular technology. Such command-and-control regulation conveys 
little discretion to regulated parties in implementation; they can 
either comply with the regulatory requirements, or fail to do so. 
This type of regulation proves less operative when regulatory 
goals are more complex. Specific rules often cannot reflect the large 
number of variables involved in achieving multifaceted regulatory 
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goals, such as reducing the types of risk produced by a combination of 
factors.15 They identify certain relevant factors that can easily be 
codified, while ignoring others. They thus direct behavior toward 
compliance with an incomplete set of detailed provisions that may 
frustrate, rather than further, the broader regulatory goal in any 
particular circumstance.16 
The problem is compounded when regulated entities are 
heterogeneous, and contexts are varied.17 One-size-fits-all rules 
cannot easily account for the ways in which risk manifests itself 
differently across firms. Moreover, regulators have neither the 
resources nor the vantage to attain the granular knowledge necessary 
to combat risk within individual companies; the uncertainty in 
predicting such individualized information further renders it 
unsuitable as a basis for ex ante mandates. 
Indeed, as demonstrated by a growing body of empirical and 
analytic research in the literature on regulation, when regulators 
attempt to reflect the breadth of uncertain contextual factors in a 
regime of precise provisions, the proliferation of rules itself creates an 
unwieldy, confusing body of mandates and exceptions leading to 
 
 15. See Douglas C. Michael, Cooperative Implementation of Federal Regulations, 13 YALE 
J. ON REG. 535, 570–71, 590, 598–600 (1996) (discussing rule failure in regulating the health risks 
of seafood, where context regulation of outcomes is not possible and causes of risk are 
innumerable and heterogeneous); Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation 13–16 
(London Sch. of Econ. and Political Sci., Econ. and Soc. Research Council, Ctr. for the Analysis 
of Risk and Regulation Discussion Paper 2002) (discussing the increase in the use of regulation 
to govern the management and distribution of risk, with particular reference to financial 
services regulation). See generally D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers in the Legal Order: The 
Exercise of Discretionary Powers, in A READER ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 275, 277 (D.J. 
Galligan ed., 1996) (discussing the changes in the nature of tasks undertaken by the state and 
the resulting tendency toward “purposive, goal-based decisions” informed by substantive, rather 
than formal, rationality, and “therefore towards discretionary authority”). Susan Sturm has 
detailed this problem in achieving the abstract goal of workplace equity. See Susan Sturm, 
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
458, 461 (2001) (discussing the problems with regulating the “complex and dynamic problems 
inherent” in workplace bias with “specific, across-the-board rules”). 
 16. Carol A. Heimer, Legislating Responsibility 5–6 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 
9711, 1997) (discussing how the “30-day rule” in neonatology clinic, under which additional 
administrative burdens were imposed if a newborn died before 30 days, encouraged efforts 
targeted on survival for that length of time, with no effect on long-term survival rates). 
 17. The shortcomings of command and control governance are well recognized. See, e.g., 
Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 40 DUKE L.J. 607, 627 (1991) (citing failures in using 
“rigid, highly bureaucratized ‘command-and-control’ regulation” to govern “hundreds, 
thousands, or even millions of companies and individuals in an exceptionally diverse nation”). 
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uncertain and inconsistent application.18 Because of such rule failure, 
regulatory precision is often a poor device for allocating decisions 
between rule makers and rule followers,19 and therefore for ensuring 
consistency in the behavior of regulated parties.20 
The extensive literature on the economics of contracts identifies 
such problems with “complete” contracting—attempting to fully 
articulate terms ex ante—in situations of complexity and 
uncertainty.21 In such circumstances, an instrument’s terms should be 
left incomplete—vague and unspecified—while future decisions about 
how to fill in the imprecision may be assigned to the party that will, at 
the appropriate time, have best access to relevant information.22 
These insights have shaped choices about regulatory design. 
Indeed, the past two decades have seen widespread experimentation 
with more “incomplete” regulatory instruments. Regulators employ 
 
 18. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, 60–75 (2002) (showing, based on a comparative study of the 
regulation of nursing homes in the United States and Australia, how a regulatory regime based 
on the proliferation of detailed rules creates an unwieldy, confusing body of rules and 
exceptions, leading to uncertain and inconsistent applications); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, 
Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 
GEO. L.J. 757, 805 (2003) (describing the problem of regulatory accretion, whereby the “system 
burdens” arising from the collective operation of rules thwart a regulated organization’s ability 
to comply); Spence, supra note 7, at 918 (discussing the “complexity critique” of regulation, 
which “see[s] a complex, ‘ossified’ system [of regulation] that often makes compliance difficult 
and impractical”); Sturm, supra note 15, at 461 (describing how in a complex system like 
employment discrimination, rules will be too general). 
 19. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards, 2003 N.Z. L. 
REV. 303, 305 (suggesting that the choice between specific and vague directives does not make 
nearly as much of a difference as is ordinarily assumed because “the adaptive behaviour of rule-
interpreters and rule-enforcers will push rules towards standards, and push standards towards 
rules”). 
 20. Indeed, these problems trouble principal-agent relationships generally. See Darren 
Hawkins & Wade Jacoby, How Agents Matter, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 199, 206 (Darren Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (“Although the 
use of particular rules is a control mechanism . . . . [n]o set of rules can be completely precise nor 
cover all contingencies; thus, there is always room for interpretation. Principals of course have 
the capacity to interpret the rules to their advantage, but so do agents. . . . Once substantial 
delegation occurs . . . . agents are more likely . . . to openly reinterpret their mandate . . . .”). 
 21. See generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the 
Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. L. REV. 187, 191 (2005) (“In contract theory, 
incompleteness is due to the fact that information is costly and sometimes unavailable to (a) the 
parties at the time of contracting or (b) the parties or the enforcing court at the time of 
enforcement.”). 
 22. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: 
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 34 (1985) (discussing “governance structures” 
put into place to resolve future contractual uncertainty). 
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performance-based measures when they can identify specific 
outcomes but cannot easily codify in generally-applicable rules the 
means for achieving them.23 Such regulation articulates a measurable 
result, but leaves “the concrete measures to achieve this end open for 
the [regulated entity] to adapt to varying local circumstances.”24 
Accordingly, it assigns the determination of required outcomes to the 
regulator—who can, ex ante, determine the desired result with 
specificity—but leaves contemporaneous implementation decisions to 
the regulated entity itself, which is more familiar with inner firm 
workings on which desired outcomes hinge. By executive order, 
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush have directed agencies, when 
feasible, to regulate by mandating performance objectives, rather 
than behavior,25 and much regulation of complicated subject matter 
takes this form. 
Certain public problems, however, lend themselves to neither 
specific behavioral commands nor measurable outcomes. Their harms 
arise in heterogeneous contexts and result from a complex interaction 
of events or behaviors that cannot be identified ex ante. Moreover, 
desired performance is difficult to identify in advance or assess 
contemporaneously. In these circumstances, outcomes (whether the 
regulated party successfully stopped a data privacy or homeland 
security breach, for example) are, in one scholar’s understated words, 
“undesirable to rely upon as the sole basis for a regulatory 
standard.”26 
Prominent twenty-first-century regulatory initiatives have 
focused on such targets. Animated by a series of scandals and 
disasters in the forefront of the public consciousness—specifically 
Enron and WorldCom, the repeated compromise of private or 
 
 23. See generally Cary Coglianese et al., Performance-Based Regulation: Prospects and 
Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 705 (2003) 
(summarizing a dialogue among regulators and researchers about performance-based 
regulation); Christine Parker, Reinventing Regulation Within the Corporation: Compliance-
Oriented Regulatory Innovation, 32 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 529, 547 (2000) (discussing “outcome-
based” regulation). 
 24. NEIL GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE SAFETY: 
SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 23 (1999). 
 25. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(8), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 
(2000) (issued by President Clinton and retained by President George W. Bush). 
 26. Cary Coglianese, Reducing Risk with Management-Based Regulation, Notes on the 
Columbia/Wharton-Penn Roundtable on Risk Management Strategies 2 (2002), 
http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/chrr/documents/meetings/roundtable/pdf/notes/coglianese_cary_
note.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2006). 
01__BAMBERGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:06 PM 
390 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:377 
secured data, and the World Trade Center attacks—regulators have 
turned their attention to preventing, and not just punishing, capital 
markets abuses, data breaches, and security compromises. These 
initiatives regulate issues of immense financial and societal 
importance. Yet their goals involve, in large part, the reduction of 
complex risks about which advance information is uncertain at best, 
in varied contexts about which administrators know far less than the 
entities they seek to regulate. 
Responding to these problems, regulators have shied away from 
regulatory detail as to either outcomes or methods. Expanding on 
regulatory models documented by Cary Coglianese and others in the 
fields of environmental protection and food safety,27 they have instead 
enlisted the expertise and judgment of regulated parties themselves—
those entities claiming the greatest familiarity with risks on the 
ground, how those risks arise, and how they can be mediated—to 
determine not just the means to achieve regulatory goals, but also the 
definition of those aims in particular contexts, and the monitoring of 
achievement. 
This development has been particularly marked in the securities 
realm, in which SEC regulations requiring the disclosure of 
operational risk generally have implicitly left to regulated firms the 
tasks of developing systems for identifying and assessing risk. These 
assignments have now become explicit, as in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
regime discussed in greater detail in Part III.C and the 2003 SEC rule 
targeting conflicts of interest on the part of investment advisers who 
exercise voting authority with respect to client securities. The 
conflicts rule sets a policy goal: it requires advisers to adopt policies 
and procedures “reasonably designed to ensure that [the adviser] 
vote[s] . . . in the best interest of clients.”28 The Commission, however, 
left the substantive detail to regulated advisers, expressly refusing to 
provide any further specifics. Indeed, the SEC would provide no 
“specific policies or procedures for advisers,” nor even “a list of 
 
 27. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 696–700 (2003) 
(describing the use of management-based regulation in the areas of food safety, industrial 
safety, and pollution prevention). 
 28. Investment Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–6(a) (2006). 
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approved procedures,” recognizing that investment advisers “are so 
varied that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is unworkable.”29 
Measures seeking to safeguard sensitive personal and financial 
information reflect a similar direction. Title V of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act30 (GLB) empowers various agencies to promulgate data 
security regulations for financial institutions.31 The Federal Trade 
Commission’s 2003 standard implementing the Act in turn instructs 
firms to develop risk assessment and data security systems 
“appropriate to your size and complexity, the nature and scope of 
your activities, and the sensitivity of any customer information at 
issue.”32 While the implementing regulations do include some 
guidance for implementation tools, such as “periodic risk 
assessments,” and “sanctions against employees that fail to comply,” 
the particular implementation is left to individual firms, and “[t]he 
ultimate test remains a broad one, that of ‘reasonable data 
security.’”33 The proposed Identity Theft Protection Act,34 and 
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005,35 each reported out 
of Senate committee, would impose information security 
requirements that track the regulatory implementation of the GLB.36 
Finally, regulators struggling for regulatory responses to 
homeland security threats in the face of international terrorism 
recognize that government must rely on the judgment of private 
actors—who own and operate approximately 85 percent of U.S. 
critical infrastructures and key assets37—for the ongoing assessment, 
identification and mitigation of the risks connected with such low-
 
 29. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Mar. 10, 2003) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). 
 30. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6827 (2000)). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801, 6805. 
 32. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2006). 
 33. Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2007) (manuscript at 7, on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(quoting Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 
77,620 (Dec. 28, 2004)). 
 34. S. 1408, 109th Cong. (2005) (approved by the Senate Commerce Committee in July 
2005 and reported to the full Senate in December 2005). 
 35. S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005) (reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee in 
November 2005). 
 36. Ira Rubinstein, Privacy and Security Legislation and Policy: The Last 12 Months, in 
SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: EVOLVING LAWS AND PRACTICES IN A 
SECURITY-DRIVEN WORLD 76–78 (Francois Gilbert et al. eds., 2006). 
 37. Wortzel, supra note 11, at 2. 
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probability, high-risk disasters.38 Thus, while regulation in this arena is 
more diffuse and less developed, regulators are experimenting with 
regimes such as New Jersey’s chemical plant protection measures, 
which turn principally to regulated plants themselves for the 
“assessment of facility vulnerabilities and hazards that might be 
exploited by potential terrorists,” and the development of 
“prevention, preparedness, and response plan[s]” including measures 
“to eliminate or minimize risk of terrorist attack, to mitigate the 
consequences of any attack that does occur, or to respond to an 
attack that does occur.”39 
Although these initiatives address a variety of substantive ills, 
they share certain important characteristics. Each articulates general 
goals, yet largely assigns to regulated firms themselves the decisions 
about specifics—everything from the meaning of the public aim in 
particular context (mitigating risk, avoiding conflicts of interest, 
protecting information, enhancing security) to the means for 
achieving it. Certainly, some measures require that regulated firms 
employ certain management processes. Yet they make few ex ante 
decisions about substantive detail, leaving such decisions—at least in 
the first instance—to the regulated firm’s judgment. 
Such developments signal a shift in the vision of the regulated 
entity. Regulated parties are increasingly no longer just the objects of 
governance, enlisted for “transmission-belt” implementation of clear 
regulatory mandates. They are partners in regulation, implicitly and 
explicitly enlisted to fill out the substance of legal norms and develop 
the means for implementing those broader principles locally 
B. Regulatory Delegation and Traditional Compliance Models 
This shift in the role of the regulated entity poses a serious 
challenge to the ways in which regulators and scholars traditionally 
think about firms and their compliance with legal mandates. In a 
world in which regulation mandated observable conduct or outcomes, 
regulators relied on traditional tools for principals’ control of agent 
behavior: making rules as specific as possible, monitoring 
performance to ensure those rules were followed, and providing 
 
 38. See MOTEFF & PARFOMAK, supra note 11. 
 39. STATE OF NEW JERSEY DOMESTIC SECURITY PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE, 
DOMESTIC SECURITY PREPAREDNESS BEST PRACTICES STANDARDS AT TCPA/DPCC 
CHEMICAL SECTOR FACILITIES 4–5 (2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
01__BAMBERGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:06 PM 
2006] REGULATION AS DELEGATION 393 
appropriate incentives—both carrots and sticks—for desired 
behavior.40 
This suite of restraints reflects the two existing visions that 
dominate administrative law understandings of private parties.41 One 
emphasizes a firm’s normative commitment to compliance. The other 
emphasizes compliance based on instrumental calculations. Because 
of their emphasis on the measurement of externally observable 
regulatory requirements, however, neither concerns itself with 
detailed understandings of behavior and decisionmaking within the 
black box of firm boundaries. When thinking about firms’ exercise of 
regulatory delegation—which inherently involves complex behavioral 
interactions between individuals and systems within firms—both 
come up short. 
1. Prevailing Compliance Models of Firm Behavior.  The first 
traditional model dominating administrative law understandings of 
private firm behavior describes regulated firms as “amoral 
calculators,”42 profit-maximizing actors who decide whether to comply 
with the law based on a calculation of the costs and benefits of doing 
so.43 Such firms’ behavior can therefore best be controlled by “top-
down” measures associated with principal-agent relationships: 
adjusting incentives so as to align the interests of regulated-agents 
with those of the regulator-principal.44 The primary means for 
affecting firm incentives involves deterrence: using monitoring and 
sanctions (fines or imprisonment) to set the cost and likelihood of ex 
post punishment sufficiently high so as to deter ex ante deviation 
from the regulator’s command.45 Certain administrative agencies, such 
 
 40. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (discussing, in the 
context of corporate shareholders and managers, market and contract controls designed to align 
the divergent interests of principals and agents). 
 41. James Salzman et al., Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 WYO. L. REV. 253, 255 (2002). 
 42. Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The “Criminology of the Corporation” and 
Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 67, 69–74 (Keith Hawkins & 
John M. Thomas eds., 1984); see also Spence, supra note 7, at 919–23 (discussing the “rational 
polluter” model of compliance to environmental regulation). 
 43. See generally Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, supra note 7, at 453–54 & 
nn.9–11 (discussing the vision of a “firm as a rational profit-maximizer, obeying the law only 
when it is in the firm’s best economic interest to do so” and associated literature). 
 44. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 40. 
 45. For classic statements of the deterrence approach, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 201–27 (1986); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
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as the SEC, include positive carrots along with punitive sticks in the 
incentive model, offering a reduction in punishment for those 
regulated firms that demonstrate good faith attempts at compliance.46 
In either form, this behavioral model reflects economist Oliver 
Williamson’s classic definition of agents: opportunistic actors “given 
to self-interest seeking with guile.”47 
The latter account, then, builds explicitly on the behavioral 
paradigm of the self-interested, utility-maximizing individual—the 
archetype embraced by “[v]irtually all of modern economics and large 
parts of the rest of social science.”48 Under this model, individual 
decisionmakers approach choices armed with knowledge of the 
available alternatives and their consequences. In addition, 
decisionmakers have a consistent hierarchy of “preferences,” which 
are “consistent values by which alternative consequences of action 
can be compared in terms of their subjective value.”49 By assessing 
alternative consequences in light of her preferences, the utility 
maximizer will make the choice that maximizes her own utility by 
choosing the greatest benefit at least cost (or, more accurately, the 
highest net benefit and the highest probability of occurrence). This 
model, accordingly, supposes a consequentialist model of 
decisionmaking, by which individuals make choices based on a 
calculated evaluation of the outcomes of various strategies. 
The amoral calculator account of regulated entities attributes this 
pattern of individual economic behavior to the firm as a whole. It 
assumes that all regulated parties, whether individuals or 
organizations, make rational calculative choices. The prevailing 
administrative account of the firm, then, is that of a unitary self-
interested actor, rationally structuring decisions in order to maximize 
profit.50 Consistent with the utility-maximizing model, incentives, if set 
 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement 
of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970). 
 46. See, e.g., Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency 
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001) 
(declining to take action against company because of internal control efforts and cooperation). 
 47. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 253 (1996). 
 48. James G. March, Understanding How Decisions Happen in Organizations, in 
ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING 10 (Zur Shapira ed., 1997). 
 49. Id. See generally DECISION MAKING: ALTERNATIVES TO RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS 
(Mary Zey ed., 1992). 
 50. Spence, supra note 7, at 918 (“The traditional view holds that firms are rational and 
self-interested economic and political actors, and rational pursuit of their self-interest guides 
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at the right level, will guide organizational decisionmaking by causing 
organizations to undertake whatever internal adjustments are 
necessary to ensure that they conform their behavior to the legal 
rule.51 
The second of the prevailing compliance models focuses on 
regulated parties who are “good apples.”52 These are agents for whom 
conformity with the law derives from “bottom-up” commitments, 
which legal sociologists credit for much, if not most, legal 
compliance.53 These firms comport their behavior, of their own 
accord, to comply with the law to the extent possible.54 Because these 
agents are hindered principally by external obstacles to compliance 
such as “ambiguous regulations, constantly shifting rules, and 
conflicting mandates,”55 regulators can best control these agents by 
providing clear rules to guide their behavior. 
These two models offer divergent motivational accounts. 
Whereas the amoral calculator is motivated by self-interest, the good 
apple is guided by a normative preference for legal compliance.56 
 
both their compliance decisions and their attempts to influence policy.”); see also Milton 
Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 21–
22 (1953) (examining the hypothesis that individual firms behave as if they were seeking 
rationally to maximize profits); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 18, at 797 (“[Environmental 
behavior] is portrayed as merely the result of a rationally derived decision whether or not to 
comply—that is, based on the perceived costs of complying versus the risk and costs of being 
caught, the ‘good apples’ decide it is efficient to comply and the ‘bad apples’ decide it is efficient 
to violate.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 693 (1997) (“[E]ntity liability 
can lead companies to institute ‘preventive measures’ that deter by making misconduct more 
difficult or expensive for wrongdoers, or by reducing the illicit benefits of unpunished (or 
successful) misconduct, without affecting the probability that it is detected by enforcement 
officials.”). 
 52. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 64–66 (1982) (arguing that most regulated enterprises are 
“good apples”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Salzman et al., supra note 41, at 255; see also Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the 
Firm, supra note 7, at 454 (describing vision of the firm as “law-abiding actor, struggling in good 
faith to comply with increasingly complicated and contradictory laws and regulations”). 
 55. Salzman et al., supra note 41, at 255. 
 56. See, e.g., Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, supra note 7, at 464–75 (“In the 
normative model, people comply with the law not out of a fear of formal legal sanctions but out 
of a sense of obligation arising from a social norm.”); see also Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1497 (1998) (discussing the “norm of 
law abidingness”). 
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Yet the two share similar understandings about firm behavior. 
The normative account mirrors the consequentialist’s assumption that 
organizations structure decisionmaking rationally, so as to conform 
behavior to legal commands.57 They both assume that firms reach 
decisions consciously and purposively.58 And they both 
anthropomorphize the firm, attributing to organizations the unitary 
decisionmaking patterns of individuals. 
The ability of both models to rely on rule precision, monitoring, 
and incentives to ensure observable compliance with specific 
commands, then, permits them to treat firms as atomistic, rational, 
purposive decisionmakers. It further obviates the need, in either case, 
to look within the “black box” of the firm to understand the ways in 
which decisionmaking actually occurs. 
2. Regulatory Delegation’s Challenge to Compliance Models.  
The delegation of regulatory discretion poses a challenge for the 
prevailing accounts of firm behavior. The existing compliance 
paradigm relies on some firms’ normative commitment to follow 
specific mandates, and other firms’ responsiveness to incentives and 
monitoring. Experience with delegation to administrative agencies, 
however, suggests that these elements alone are insufficient to guide 
organizations’ exercise of broad regulatory discretion. 
Certainly, the dominant model of control and the behavioral 
premise of rational purposive action by regulated firms on which it 
rests explain important elements of firm behavior, regardless of the 
level of discretion delegated. Business organizations are generally 
sensitive to profits, and therefore to government penalties. They are 
often able to organize their operations to respond successfully to 
market pressures, and to pursue the strategic and normative goals set 
forth by management. Moreover, the delegation of decisionmaking 
discretion to private firms does not change their nature as parties who 
must follow the law. Thus imposing civil or criminal penalties 
provides an important means of ex post punishment for the bad 
apples who violate regulatory mandates. 
 
 57. See, e.g., BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 52, at 64–65 (making the case that the “good 
apples” have the strongest conception of the link between compliance and long-term self-
interest, and the most effective internal controls to achieve regulatory compliance). 
 58. See Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive 
Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 480 (“[T]he normative 
or moral decision-making model agrees with rational choice theory’s claim that people generally 
make conscious and systematic decisions . . . .”). 
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Yet experience suggests that these approaches are, at best, 
imprecise controls on private firm decisionmaking. Firms engage in 
financial misrepresentation even when discovery and punishment is 
virtually assured. Even good-apple firms that seek to implement 
effective internal controls fail to comply with regulatory mandates. 
Especially in contexts in which regulatory delegation is prevalent, 
traditional models of control fare poorly.59 
Some of the imprecision in control may be addressed by 
overcoming the challenges inherent in the tools themselves: the 
difficulties of determining optimal incentives for deterrence,60 the 
challenge and costs of effective monitoring,61 and the complexity of 
promoting independent norms of law abidingness in business firms. 
Indeed, regulation has integrated creative means both for better 
aligning the incentives of private actors with government (such as 
regulatory schemes that rely on market-based incentives rather than 
deterrence62) and for improving monitoring of outcomes (by, for 
 
 59. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY 
RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 4 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d03138.pdf (finding that, between January 1997 and June 2002, 10 percent of all listed 
companies announced at least one financial restatement, and that financial restatements due to 
prior irregularities grew 145 percent); Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 18, at 791–96 (“[F]ull 
compliance with regulatory mandates is seldom achieved.”); id. at 823–24 (“[E]very compliance 
study of environmental law to date has revealed significant levels of noncompliance.”); Joyce E. 
Cutler, Large Number of Companies Noncompliant with Environmental Laws, EPA Official 
Says, 29 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 2233 (1999); James Surowiecki, The Dirty Little Truth About 
Corporate Lies, SLATE, July 6, 1998, http://www.slate.com/id/1001803/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) 
(discussing survey of CFOs indicating that 12 percent admitted misrepresenting corporate 
financial results at the request of senior company executives, and another 55 percent had been 
asked to misrepresent results, but had “fought off” the demand). 
 60. The difficulty in setting optimal incentives to ensure deterrence proves a challenge 
because, to determine the right penalty level, a regulator needs to calculate accurately the costs 
of compliance, as well as the probability of detection and enforcement. Such detailed 
information may simply be inaccessible to public administrators, especially because these costs 
vary radically by firm. See DOUGLAS NEEDHAM, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
REGULATION: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH 335 (1983) (discussing regulators’ inability to know 
actual costs and benefits when setting incentives). See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
OBEY THE LAW 22–23, 67 (1990) (noting “practical difficulties of implementing a policy based 
only on the increased use of threatened or delivered punishment”); Tom R. Tyler, Public 
Mistrust of the Law, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 857–58 (1998) (noting that deterrence is difficult 
because it depends on the likelihood of being caught); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent, 45 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 871, 873–74 (1997) (highlighting the high costs of deterrence). 
 61. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 80–81 (“[M]onitoring is a far more 
difficult and costly practice than we conventionally assume.”). 
 62. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342–43 (1985) (advocating marketable permits in part on the ground that 
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example, focusing on the independence of third-party auditors). 
Administrative agencies have also experimented with innovations 
intended to promote normative commitments to compliance. For 
example, programs under which regulated firms may negotiate the 
content of applicable rules, seek (among other things) to promote 
those businesses’ acceptance of the legal mandate.63 Moreover, agency 
programs that publicize high levels of compliance are calculated to 
convince regulated parties of the fairness of regulatory regimes. Legal 
sociologists have found this to increase a decisionmaker’s sense of 
normative duty.64 
Yet shortcomings of models relying either on top-down 
incentives or bottom-up faith inhere in the approaches themselves. As 
in the administrative agency context, the very nature of broad 
delegation blunts the applicability of two of the standard control 
mechanisms. By definition, a regime that accords regulated parties 
wide discretion relinquishes its effectiveness as a precise directive. 
Similarly, the more a regulation prescribes broad policy goals, rather 
than specific behavior or a measurable outcome, the more difficult it 
is to monitor compliance. As discussed in Part I.A., attempts to boil 
down complex goals to auditable tasks often thwart the 
accomplishment of the wider objective. 
 
marketability puts the regulatory information-processing burden on “business managers and 
engineers who are in the best position to figure out how to cut back on their plants’ pollution 
costs”); Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Law and Policy 33–43 (John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Working Paper No. RWP04-023, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=552043 (discussing a number of alternative means of adjusting incentives, including 
pollution charges, tradable permit systems, market friction reductions, and government subsidy 
reductions). 
 63. See Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (Recommendation No. 82-4), 
1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1993) (expressing expectation that negotiated rulemaking would result in 
rules more acceptable to the interests affected by agency decisions). But see Cary Coglianese, 
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 
1255, 1335 (1997) (concluding on the basis of empirical study that “[n]egotiated rulemaking does 
not appear any more capable of . . . avoiding litigation than do the rulemaking procedures 
ordinarily used by agencies”). 
 64. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 SWISS J. 
ECON. & STAT. 219, 220–22 (1997). That same result is achieved when a decisionmaker believes 
that most others are behaving according to the same norm, see Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective 
Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 341–42 (2001) (“In sum, individuals behave like the 
amoral calculators posited by the conventional theory only when they believe that others are 
cheaters; if they believe that others are morally motivated to comply, they reciprocate by 
complying in turn, whether or not they believe that they could profitably evade.”), and that 
those who are not are being punished. 
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Private firm agents, furthermore, possess characteristics 
indicating particular incentives to exploit the “slack” inherent in their 
delegation. They are structured around strong corporate self-
interest—the very interest the legal and economic literatures are most 
concerned will capture public decisionmaking.65 And they are 
“permeable,”66 in that they are particularly responsive to influences 
other than the interests of regulator-principal, such as the behavior of 
competitors, the interests of consumers, and the pressures of the 
market.  
Finally, the information asymmetries between regulated firms 
and administrative agencies—one of the important justifications for 
employing regulatory delegations in the first place—prevents 
effective monitoring. Not only do regulated entities possess superior 
knowledge about the workings of their organization, their behavior is 
often, by practical constraints or even by operation of law, more 
effectively hidden within the firm. 
These factors all suggest the insufficiency of incentives, imperfect 
monitoring, and faith in good apples to guide private implementation 
of broad and imprecise public mandates. Certainly regulatory 
delegation creates the opportunity for individual firms to participate 
creatively in developing effective governance solutions, and some 
firms might seize the chance. Yet relying on the trappings of a 
traditional enforcement framework to ensure an across-the-board 
pursuit of public norms provides only illusory control of firm 
behavior; it leaves too much to chance. 
C. Drawing from a Different Model: The Administrative 
Accountability Paradigm 
The mismatch between regulatory delegation and traditional 
methods for administrative control of regulated parties should not 
pose much surprise to scholars of administrative behavior. Indeed, 
the difficulty in “commanding” and “controlling” broad 
decisionmaking discretion constitutes the central focus of 
administrative law. 
 
 65. See infra note 80 (citing the literature on capture of administrative processes by private 
interests). 
 66. See Hawkins & Jacoby, supra note 20, at 208–10 (discussing ways in which agents are 
permeable to third parties). 
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Specifically, administrative law concerns itself with ways to shape 
policy decisions that Congress delegates to the judgment of 
administrative agencies, bodies largely unanticipated by the 
Constitution’s three-branch framework67 yet essential to the massive 
project of modern governance. Traditional legislative delegation 
frequently involves contexts in which there is little ability to monitor 
particular outcomes. The administrative state accordingly turns to 
agencies to use their judgment, informed by difficult-to-measure 
factors such as expertise and executive politics. 
Administrative law recognizes that the exercise of such judgment 
is difficult to police. Accordingly, it has long abandoned notions of 
straightforward agency compliance with legislative mandate.68 Instead, 
it is animated by a model of agency accountability. 
Indeed, when the ex post measurement of outcomes is elusive, or 
outcomes are insufficient as a means for assessing decisionmaking, 
the accountability model rejects singular reliance on traditional 
principal-agent control tools. It relies instead on a robust set of 
doctrines, procedures, and relationships intended to channel 
decisionmaking in ways that promote both more effective 
decisionmaking in the service of public goals, and independent values 
about the ways in which public norms should be pursued. Specifically, 
the accountability paradigm regulates decisionmaking to promote 
rationality, responsiveness to public norms, and reviewability by 
others. 
The accountability model provides a useful blueprint for the 
oversight of regulatory delegation. It takes seriously the notions that 
policy solutions are complicated and varied, and that parties to whom 
discretion is given should employ their knowledge and judgment in 
the service of effective solutions. It further recognizes that 
organizational decisionmakers do not behave in any one singular 
manner—let alone in the manner of a rational maximizer; rather, 
organizational decisionmaking is complex, and can only be affected 
through a combination of inexact means. Exploring this framework 
for making administrative delegatees answer for decisionmaking 
 
 67. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The 
Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 328, 370–71 (2001) (providing summary of discourse regarding the place of agencies in 
constitutional structure). 
 68. See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text (discussing the “transmission-belt” model 
of the administrative state). 
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offers important guidance when those same actors in turn delegate 
decisions to those they regulate. 
1. Administrative Delegation.  The administrative state governs 
through delegation.69 Congress possesses exclusive power to legislate 
regulatory principles and priorities, but lacks both the constitutional 
capacity to execute laws and the resources to shape legislative 
principle into particularized policies. By delegating significant 
policymaking discretion to administrative agencies to supply the 
practical detail necessary for regulatory implementation, however, it 
enlists their relative expertise, ability to research and collect pertinent 
information, and capacity to devote extended time and attention to 
specific problems.70 
Administrative law’s vision of agency decisionmaking has 
transformed to reflect developments in governance. The “traditional 
model” conceived of the “agency as a mere transmission belt for 
implementing legislative directives in particular cases.”71 
Congressional dictates guaranteed that agency action was 
“commanded by a legitimate source of authority—the legislature.”72 
The “additional assurance” of judicial review73 further “ensure[d] 
compliance with legislative directives.”74 
The very idiom of the traditional model, however, rings hollow in 
an era when federal legislation charging administrative agencies with 
broad goals has long eliminated the specificity on which the 
 
 69. The delegation of authority may either occur explicitly, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“[When Congress has] explicitly 
left a gap for [an] agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”), or implicitly, by assigning to 
agencies the task of administering statutes containing some ambiguity or “gap,” United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: 
Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1281–82 (2002) 
(discussing implications of implicit administrative delegation). 
 70. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on 
Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 427–30 (1989) (noting the transformation in practice 
accompanying the rise of the administrative state from “direct (‘transitive’) legislative resolution 
of policy problems to indirect (‘intransitive’) resolution through the empowerment of agents”). 
 71. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1669, 1675 (1975). 
 72. Id. at 1675; see also id. at 1672–74 (describing how specific directives curb official 
discretion, promote formal justice, and ensure the legitimacy of governmental actions). 
 73. Id. at 1675. 
 74. Id. at 1676. 
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“transmission belt” theory relied.75 Congress now explicitly assigns 
agencies future decisions for which the details cannot be determined 
in advance. Administrative policymakers are asked instead to 
exercise good judgment—informed by expertise and information to 
which they have access—in choosing between a variety of possible 
options under conditions of uncertainty. In this light, a model of 
“controlling” agency “compliance” makes little sense.76 Judgment is 
an activity that is difficult to control, and discretion is inherent in its 
exercise. 
Modern administrative law has, accordingly, focused its attention 
instead on problems raised by the exercise of discretion—problems 
that can undermine both the legitimacy and efficacy of resulting 
decisions. It recognizes that delegation to agents, though necessary 
for large-scale administration, poses several categories of foreseeable 
challenges.77 
First is the danger that permitting undemocratic, 
extraconstitutional decisionmakers to construe the law unfettered by 
precise statutory mandate will foster arbitrary or unreflective 
governance. The absence of any constraint on the exercise of power 
poses a particular problem in light of fundamental rule-of-law values, 
which require rationality and regularity in legal application.78 
Second, broad discretion creates the possibility that the exercise 
of power will respond to private, rather than public, priorities. The 
concern over taint by private interests takes several forms. Most 
 
 75. Id. (“Vague, general, or ambiguous statutes create discretion and threaten the 
legitimacy of agency action under the ‘transmission belt’ theory of administrative law.”); see also 
id. at 1677 (“[F]ederal legislation establishing agency charters has, over the past several decades, 
often been strikingly broad and nonspecific, and has accordingly generated the very conditions 
which the traditional model was designed to eliminate.” (citations omitted)). 
 76. Id. at 1672–76. 
 77. There is, of course, a vigorous literature setting forth fundamental constitutional and 
policy arguments against the legitimacy of delegation—especially broad delegation—to 
unelected agencies in the first place. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 133 (1980) (“That legislators often find it convenient to escape 
accountability is precisely the reason for a non-delegation doctrine.”); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE 
END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 127 (1969) 
(“[Delegation] becomes pathological, and criticizable, at the point where it comes to be 
considered a good thing in itself, flowing to administrators without guides, checks, safeguards.”). 
 78. See generally A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 120 (8th ed. 1982) (stating that rule of law requires, “in the first place, the 
absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary 
power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even wide discretionary 
authority on the part of the government”). 
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simply, particular decisionmakers (whether individual bureaucrats or 
agencies as a whole) may seek to aggrandize their own power,79 
minimize their effort level, or favor personal policy predilections over 
those of Congress. More generally, the process of administrative 
decisionmaking itself may be captured by interested private factions.80 
Courts have identified a third type of danger when administrative 
discretion is delegated to private parties rather than to public 
regulators: the decisionmaker may be both self-aggrandizing and self-
interested.81 
Finally, because its exercise often need not be justified, wide 
managerial discretion may render careful explanation by 
decisionmakers unnecessary, thus obscuring the reasons underlying 
particular decisions. In this way, broad leeway can imperil the ability 
of democratic or constitutional institutions like the public, Congress, 
and the courts to oversee agencies and review their decisions.82 
Thus, discretion in the interpretation and implementation of 
regulatory directives may compromise three related governance 
values: rationality in choosing between solutions; responsiveness to 
public interests; and reviewability by others. These shortcomings 
jeopardize both the effective pursuit of legislative goals, and public 
law norms about decisionmaking in the exercise and implementation 
of government power. 
 
 79. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 915, 917 (2005) (“[The] pervasive assumption in constitutional law and theory is that 
government officials are empire-builders, imperialistically or avariciously intent upon 
maximizing the power or wealth of their offices and institutions.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1039 (1997) (discussing the development of “capture theory,” which depicted 
administrative agencies as the captives of big business); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (“According to the 
capture hypothesis, instead of providing meaningful input into deliberation about the public 
interest, industry representatives co-opt governmental regulatory power in order to satisfy their 
private desires.”); Stewart, supra note 71, at 1684–86 (describing how administrative agencies 
are captured by the interests they are charged to regulate). 
 81. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (rooting the proscription on 
delegation to private parties in the concern over self-interested regulation); Sierra Club v. 
Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 962 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (observing that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
hiring a private consulting firm was particularly troubling when the private firm essentially 
prepared the environmental impact statement for a project in which it had a stake). 
 82. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(“Agencies must articulate a satisfactory explanation for their action to permit effective judicial 
review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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2. Administrative Law and the Accountability Paradigm.  
Modern administrative law seeks methods beyond control to 
safeguard against the dangers of broad delegation. Specifically, it 
seeks to channel the exercise of discretionary authority by making 
administrative decisionmaking “accountable.” Although different 
scholars employ that term more or less broadly,83 this Article follows 
the path of those who understand accountability generally as “checks 
on decision making”84 intended to channel discretion so as to promote 
both effective and legitimate regulatory decisions. 
More specifically, the accountability model seeks to overcome 
uncertainty about changing circumstances or precise substantive 
results by other means. As to the question “accountable for what?” 
administrative law supplements incomplete demands for specific 
solutions with requirements that decisions be made consonant with 
rule-of-law and sound decisionmaking notions of deliberation, 
thoroughness and consistency. As to the question “accountable to 
what ends?” it emphasizes the touchstone of public norms, however 
general, articulated by Congress. And regarding “accountable to 
whom?” the administrative process involves multiple players, 
including Congress, the courts, the executive, and a variety of private 
actors, making clear that administrative decisions must be made in a 
way that both results and decision processes themselves can be 
reviewed from the outside. 
Throughout, the accountability model recognizes that 
discretionary decisionmaking is complicated. It implicitly rejects a 
simplified rational actor model of agency behavior, and is informed 
not only by legal theory and policy, but also increasingly by political 
science and economic understandings of how institutions and the 
individuals within them make decisions in the political arena. 
 
 83. Compare Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy 
in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2003) (distinguishing political accountability 
to democratic branches of government from other values like rational policymaking), with 
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1700 (2002) (noting that approaches to accountability dominating by 
economic values often do not adequately take noneconomic values into account), and Marshall 
J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 423, 423 
(1996) (identifying various types of accountability in addition to “[a]ccountability [t]hrough 
[d]irect [d]emocracy”). See generally Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (2005) (rejecting notions that electoral control 
and decisionmaking devolution actually constitute “accountability,” and promoting 
administrative hierarchy as necessary for accountability). 
 84. Freeman, Private Role, supra note 12, at 664. 
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Based on these understandings of bureaucratic behavior, 
administrative law regulates decisionmaking, in large part through 
structural design. It ensures that a variety of government and private 
actors, each with their own interests, capacities, and approaches to 
problems, have particular roles in the discussion. Directly elected 
legislators set goals guided by political calculus. Private parties 
represent a host of divergent interests through participatory 
procedures. Agencies guided by substantive expertise and informed 
by executive policies promulgate regulations. Independent judges, 
guided by precedent and legal principle, review the resulting 
determinations. Through the administrative structure, multiple 
participants—each armed with a different decisionmaking logic—
participate in the process that leads to a final agency decision. 
This external structure shapes internal agency decisionmaking. 
Formal participation processes govern the procedures by which 
agencies gather knowledge. The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)85 itself requires consideration of divergent perspectives in a 
number of ways.86 Its notice-and-comment provisions, for example, 
compel agencies promulgating rules to account for a written record 
filled with information and interpretations from a host of conflicting 
viewpoints.87 By legislation and executive order, Congress and the 
President further compel agencies to consider information they might 
not ordinarily address, such as the impact on the environment,88 state 
 
 85. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 86. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative 
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 79 nn.226–27 (1998) (noting that the APA facilitates deliberative 
agency decisions); Stewart, supra note 71, at 1670 (noting that APA procedures are “designed to 
promote the accuracy, rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative 
directives”). 
 87. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (setting forth notice and comment requirements for 
administrative rulemaking). See generally Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 
(1996) (“[N]otice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act [are] designed 
to assure due deliberation.”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference 
to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 660–62 (1996) (arguing that 
APA procedural safeguards promote fair and informed administrative decisionmaking). 
 88. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–
(v) (2000), for example, mandated that agencies prepare Environmental Impact Statements. By 
explicitly instructing agencies to consider types of information not previously taken into 
account, NEPA changed decision outcomes by “making bureaucracies think.” SERGE TAYLOR, 
MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 3–4 (1984). 
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and local governments89 and small business,90 as well as the costs and 
benefits of regulatory decisions.91 
Judicial standards further shape the decision process. Under both 
the APA’s proscription against “arbitrary and capricious” agency 
action92 and Chevron’s step-two reasonableness requirement,93 courts 
require that agencies engage in reasoned deliberation in reaching 
their decisions.94 Specifically, they require that agencies take account 
of all of the information in the record and explain, in a public way, 
why they reached their outcome in light of contrary data, arguments, 
and alternatives presented.95 Through such requirements, “all of the 
intensity of [judicial] review is directed toward identifying flaws in the 
agency’s decisional process.”96 
Finally, the transparent nature of administrative record building 
and agency decisionmaking further facilitates accountability in a host 
 
 89. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 § 2, 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (2000). 
 90. Regulatory Flexibility Act § 3, 5 U.S.C. 603(a) (2000). 
 91. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) 
(“In deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies should assess all costs and benefits of 
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating.”). 
 92. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 
(1983) (holding that the APA’s proscription against arbitrary and capricious decision making 
requires reasoned decision making); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 415–17 (1971) (same). 
 93. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 457–59 (2002) (discussing APA/Chevron parallels); 
Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1253, 1263–66 (1997) (discussing lower court cases interpreting Chevron’s step-two 
“reasonableness” requirement to parallel APA cases requirement and thereby hold that an 
interpretation is not “reasonable” unless well explained). 
 94. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating 
that agency action is arbitrary and capricious when “the agency has not really taken a ‘hard 
look’ at the salient problems and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 95. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for 
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 315 (1996) (“Well-settled principles of 
administrative review plainly require agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their legal 
interpretations . . . .”); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial 
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 518 (2002) (“On its face, arbitrary and 
capricious review, as currently implemented under the “hard-look” or “relevant factors” rubric, 
is almost entirely a process-based evaluation. It does not compare the outcome to some ideal 
that the judge has in mind, and eschews inquiring whether the agency decision, in fact, turned 
out to be wise. It essentially asks the agency to explain why it reached the outcome it did in light 
of data available to the agency, alternatives to the outcome, and arguments presented to the 
agency by those whom the rule will affect.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 96. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 589 (2002). 
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of ways. These processes make agency explanations available to 
Congress, which can evaluate the agency’s implementation of 
legislative goals and formulate legislative responses. As discussed 
previously, they allow courts to assess agency decisionmaking without 
necessarily intruding on the substance of decision outcomes. And 
they provide both private groups and other government institutions 
with meaningful yardsticks for reviewing, assessing, and critiquing 
ultimate agency action.97 
The accountability paradigm, then, relies on the involvement of 
multiple actors and methods in the search for regulatory solutions. 
These actors bring to bear varied institutional capacities and decision-
process strengths on regulatory choices. In this model, static notions 
of control are supplemented—and often supplanted—by learning, 
dialogue, process, and accountability. 
3. Administrative Accountability as a Model for Structuring 
Regulatory Delegation.  The administrative accountability model 
provides a useful model for addressing similar problems arising from 
the delegation of decisionmaking to regulated firms. It first suggests 
that when delegations involve complex issues and require the exercise 
of significant discretion by agents, traditional methods for controlling 
behavior may prove ineffective at promoting solutions consonant with 
legislative goals and public norms. 
Second, it suggests that additional measures intended to channel 
discretion must be informed by an understanding of the challenges to 
good decisionmaking particular to the context. 
Third, it emphasizes the participation of a variety of actors in the 
decision process, each animated by different institutional concerns 
and approaches to decisionmaking. In particular, it highlights the role 
of external information inputs and outside influences on internal 
processes in promoting rational, responsive, and reviewable decisions. 
Finally, it suggests that focusing on those processes, rather than 
just on substantive outcomes, provides one measure by which 
external parties can assess the administrative exercise of discretion 
without losing the benefits of delegation by reexamining every agency 
decision de novo. This approach, in turn, makes a certain level of 
decisional transparency essential to permitting meaningful review. In 
 
 97. See Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 97 (Winter 1994) (discussing Congress’s direct “police-patrol” 
monitoring, and indirect “fire-alarm” oversight in which informed third-parties provide signals). 
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such a framework, accountability provides a means for promoting 
good decisionmaking when commands and controls are not enough. 
The subsequent two parts of this Article seek to explore the ways 
in which an accountability paradigm might be applied to regulatory 
delegations. Drawing on the paradigm’s recognition of the complexity 
inherent in political and agency decisionmaking, Part II develops a 
detailed account of decisionmaking in regulated firms, with particular 
emphasis on the ways in which firms’ efficient organization can create 
tensions with the effective pursuit of public goals. So informed, Part 
III then applies the remaining lessons of the administrative law 
model, suggesting a framework for regulating private firm 
decisionmaking in a way that promotes accountability. 
II.  LEARNING FROM THE LITERATURE ON BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS—HOW DELEGATION TO REGULATED FIRMS 
CREATES ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS 
The dominant models for controlling regulated firm behavior—
bottom-up normative commitments and top-down government 
control—share two characteristics. First, they envision firms as 
unitary decisionmakers, treating whole organizations as single legal 
actors. Second, the dominant models focus on shaping the 
preferences of atomistic corporations, which presupposes that firms 
can achieve regulatory goals in a purposive and rational manner. 
By collapsing firms and their constituent members into unitary 
actors, these models neglect the importance of each. For in reality 
“firm” behavior is a product of both the interaction of numerous 
individuals within a company and the complex effect of particular 
organizational context in shaping those individuals’ behaviors. 
Recent corporate law scholarship drawing on insights in the 
management and organizational behavior literatures emphasizes that 
corporate decisionmaking cannot be understood by a monolithic 
template of organizational rationality. Rather, it is dependent on 
relations among individual actors within firms.98 Pathbreaking 
 
 98. For diverse examples of this wide-ranging scholarship, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why 
A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 41 (2002) 
(“Concerns about groupthink, social loafing, and collective action failures, however, all prove 
relevant to operationalizing group decisionmaking in the corporate setting.”); Margaret M. Blair 
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 264 (1999) 
(“[S]ome kinds of outcomes can only be achieved through joint effort—sometimes the joint 
effort of large numbers of people.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the 
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literature in behavioral law and economics has further dismantled the 
building blocks underlying models of rational firm behavior, 
exploring the predictable failures of rationality in individual 
decisionmaking and cognition.99 And the broader social science 
research on which these approaches draw reveals that organizational 
dynamics arising from individual cognition and relationships mold 
firm behavior at least as much as—and often in ways that subvert—
the purposive pursuit of institutional goals. 
Because administrative law has enlisted private firms in 
regulatory decisions, it must learn the lessons of those who study 
private firm decisionmaking by opening the “black box” of the firm to 
examine the decision systems within. This Part accordingly discusses 
the pertinent literature on organizational behavior, and considers its 
implications for the capacity of firms to implement regulation 
consistent with public norms. It then considers the ways in which 
predictable behavioral pathologies can undermine firms’ capacities to 
make regulatory decisions in a manner that effectively furthers 
regulatory ends. In other words, efficient firm organization can itself 
make firm decisionmaking unaccountable. 
A. How Firms Organize Decisionmaking Around Efficiency 
1. Overcoming Limits of Individual Cognition.  Firms are 
comprised of individuals. When regulation entrusts firms with 
pursuing legal ends, it relies on their ability to coordinate those 
individuals successfully. This organizational challenge would be 
formidable even if all members of the firm conformed to the ideal of 
 
Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (2003) (“There 
are many fascinating angles to an inquiry into whether corporate agents have an affirmative 
duty to disclose information to their superiors . . . .”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, 
CEOs, and Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315–16 (2005) (“[T]he focus of 
corporate law should be on the CEO and the entire senior management structure of the 
corporation, examining the relationship of that structure to the board’s ability to perform.”); 
Symposium, Corporate Misbehavior by Elite Decision-Makers: Perspectives from Law and Social 
Psychology, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1165 (2005). This turn in scholarship was pioneered by John C. 
Coffee, Jr. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099 (1977) [hereinafter 
Coffee, Shut-Eyed Sentry]; John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1980). 
 99. For an influential account of the behavioral influence in legal economics, see Christine 
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1501–05 
(1998). See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision 
Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998). 
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a fully rational actor. Even in rational choice models100 individuals 
diverge in their preferences, and therefore in their assessments of 
how to maximize utility. Thus, coordinating even fully rational 
individuals requires aligning the economic interests and normative 
goals of each with those of the firm so as to direct personal choices 
toward organizational ends. 
The management challenge is rendered even more complex, 
however, by the ways in which humans actually make decisions. 
Whereas rational choice theory models individuals with perfect (or at 
least sufficient) information about their preferences and the 
alternatives open to them, real individuals are at best “boundedly” 
rational, constrained by the limits of both the human mind and 
practicality.101 Biological constraints on perceptual and computational 
capacity mean that real human decisionmakers can never hope to 
process all available information about all possible choices, or predict 
the implications of every decision. Moreover, a decisionmaker’s 
limited attentional capability precludes focused consideration of 
every alternative—a result exacerbated by the prohibitive cost in time 
and other resources.102 
 
 100. Under a rational choice model, actors make decisions based both on complete 
information about available alternatives, their implications, and on a full awareness of their 
preferences, which are stable, identifiable and exogenous to—that is, they preexist—any 
particular decision. By measuring alternatives against preferences, the rational person makes 
choices that maximize utility. 
 101. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957) (“The capacity of the human mind 
for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the 
problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)); see also KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 37 (1974) 
(“[T]he scarcity of information-handling ability is an essential feature for the understanding of 
both individual and organizational behavior.”); CHESTER I. BARNARD, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE 
EXECUTIVE 305 (1968) (“Much of the error of historians, economists and all of us in daily 
affairs arises from imputing logical reason to men who could not or cannot base their actions on 
reason.”). 
 102. See David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, 
and Financial Reporting 5–9 (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2002/ 
2002-5.pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (reviewing the theory and evidence on limited attention 
and information processing). The debate as to the precise limits of human computational 
capacity and to the extent it might be affected by organizational and technological structures 
falls beyond the scope of this paper. See Joseph Porac & Zur Shapira, On Mind, Environment, 
and Simon’s Scissors of Rational Behavior, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 206, 209–10 (2001) 
(discussing psychological and neuroscientific research). Yet at a minimum, boundedly rational 
individuals face constraints on the attention that can be paid to a variety of important factors, 
including which tasks will attract their focus, which of any number of conflicting goals they will 
consider in a given circumstance, and which possible paths will deserve more complete 
consideration. See generally JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING (1994) 
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Humans, therefore, must make decisions with only imperfect 
information about available courses of action or their consequences, 
conflicted understandings of underlying goals, and uncertainty as to 
the relation between the three.103 
The human mind adapts to these shortcomings by developing 
unconscious cognitive shortcuts that generally make it easier to make 
sense of new situations even in the absence of complete information. 
These “biases” or “heuristics” rely on unconscious cues from familiar 
aspects of context: a single contextual element can prompt a 
decisionmaker about the more general nature of an unfamiliar 
setting, and therefore permit her to make efficient decisions even in 
situations of uncertainty. Rather than “maximizing,” then, humans 
consider only a few possible courses of action and “satisfice[],”104 
choosing to settle for a solution that is adequate. 
The importance of situational cues for unconscious shortcuts in 
human thinking reveals the extent to which decisions are wrought by 
an environment humans do not control, rather than by purposive 
choices. Legal sociologist Mark Suchman provides an example to 
illustrate the ways in which even ostensibly rational choices are 
shaped by unconscious cognitive processes. Imagine, he suggests, 
“that one finds oneself confronted by a large bag of coins sitting in 
the open door of an unattended armored car.”105 How does one 
decide what to do? A consequentialist account—such as the 
deterrence model—would emphasize “the mental calculus of 
appraising the value of the coins, assessing the probability of 
successfully appropriating them, and estimating the certainty and 
severity of punishment.”106 A normative account, such as the good-
apple paradigm, would accentuate the values that one applies once 
one has appropriately identified the context as one in which the norm 
should prevail.107 
 
(discussing attentional limits); James G. March & Zur Shapira, Variable Risk Preferences and 
the Focus of Attention, 99 PSYCH. REV. 172 (1992) (same). 
 103. The implications of these constraints pervade the decision process. Not only is the 
decisionmaker uncertain about empirical facts, but he or she is uncertain about the logical 
implications of those facts. See Roy Radner, Bounded Rationality, Indeterminacy, and the 
Theory of the Firm, 106 ECON. J. 1360, 1367 (1996). 
 104. HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxix (3d ed. 1976). 
 105. Suchman, supra note 58, at 483. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. “A normative account, too, would emphasize conscious mental reactions, but 
instead of focusing on the weighing of costs and benefits, it would focus on one’s internal moral 
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Yet a cognitive understanding of decisionmaking emphasizes 
processes logically prior to the other two: the culturally-specific 
process of construing the meaning of the ambiguous social reality108 
one encounters. As Professor Suchman further describes: 
[C]ognitive models emphasize the choices that we make without 
ever noticing. Often, certain lines of action simply seem obvious, 
natural or necessary as part of “the way the world works.” Given 
this, the most important determinants of decision-making may be 
neither costs and benefits nor moral principles, but rather, the 
taken-for-granted cultural categories, definitions and accounts that 
help us to make sense of our lives.109 
Accordingly, the cognitive component of decisionmaking 
addresses, in large part, how one identifies what information is 
pertinent, interprets that information, and makes sense of those 
interpretations. In the example of the armored car, assessments of 
context (“What kind of situation is this?”), identity (“What kind of 
person am I?”), and even role (“As guard/bank officer/bystander/ 
thief, is there a standard routine that I follow?”) would largely frame 
one’s ultimate choice, and shape any subsequent purposive inquiry 
into what norms should be invoked, or what consequences might 
follow. These cognitive frames explain puzzles such as how 
individuals committed to certain normative principles may, in context, 
act contrary to those principles, or how they make decisions 
inconsistent with their “self-interest.” 
They also explain why, despite the fact that humans have only 
limited information processing capacity, individuals frequently make 
decisions leading to efficient outcomes. The behavioral literature 
describes an adaptive process by which humans act according to 
“rules,” or general shortcuts applicable across contexts, precluding 
the need to consider anew the character, costs and benefits, and 
implications of every given choice.110 
As the armored car scenario suggests, rules shape appropriate 
behavior by defining identities, roles, and what is expected in certain 
 
dialogue about the propriety of theft, the justificatory power of personal or familial need, and 
the (im)morality of concentrated wealth.” Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 482. 
 110. JAMES G. MARCH, MARTIN SCHULZ & XUEGUANG ZHOU, THE DYNAMICS OF RULES: 
CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL CODES 6 (2000). 
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categories of situations.111 Thus, they provide preexisting patterns that 
simplify decisionmaking by narrowing down an unlimited 
combination of uncertain consequences and preferences to a three-
step task. First they indicate, with respect to context, the appropriate 
construction of the self: “Which of my identities is relevant?” Second, 
they make sense of the reality: “How do I code the situation in which 
I find myself?” Third, they construe the match between the two: 
“What do my identities tell me to do in the situation as I have defined 
it?”112 
The ability of context to shape cognition suggests the role of 
firms in promoting efficient decisionmaking. Firms provide a 
particular organizational setting that shapes both the conscious and 
unconscious rules of decision for individuals within them. In this 
sense, firm organization can be understood, at least in part, as a 
response to the constraints of individual cognition. Although any one 
individual may lack the capacity to collect, possess and assess all of 
the information and knowledge necessary for complex industrial 
processes, such capacity can be harnessed by the coordination of 
multiple boundedly rational actors,113 permitting the organization 
itself to “choose” more “rationally.” 
Coordinating tasks through formally rational structures permits 
firms to augment, rather than just aggregate, the capacities of the 
individual in a number of ways.114 
Most simply, firms organize administratively in ways that limit 
the attention and perception demands on any individual 
decisionmaker. Employees are organized into discrete subunits, each 
assigned a discrete set of tasks and subgoals, and charged with 
mastery of a limited set of information. A maintenance worker in a 
particular plant can focus on the immediate needs of machinery on 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. ARROW, supra note 101, at 37 (“[T]he value of nonmarket decision-making, the 
desirability of creating organizations of a scope more limited than the market as a whole, is 
partially determined by the characteristics of the network of information flows.”); Cristiano 
Antonelli, The Governance of Technological Knowledge: Strategies, Processes and Public 
Policies 6 (Univ. of Turin Dep’t of Econ. Working Paper No. 6, 2003) (discussing the resource-
based theory of the firm consensus around the assumption that the generation of knowledge is 
the distinctive feature of the firm). 
 114. The informational implications of organization, of course, track the more general 
recognition that “people can produce more if they cooperate.” PAUL MILGROM & JOHN 
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 25 (1992). 
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the production floor without having to allocate attention to the 
broader firm goal of profit maximization.115 An attorney in the general 
counsel’s office can attend to contracts with particular suppliers 
without diverting consideration to customer relations. And a 
customer sales representative can focus on clients without worrying 
about production processes. This distribution of decision 
responsibility throughout the firm mitigates any individual 
decisionmaker’s attention and perception constraints, while 
permitting the organization as a whole to engage in the wide variety 
of activities necessary in the modern corporation. 
Similarly, firms mitigate constraints on individual perception and 
attention through what scholars of social cognition in organizations 
call “knowledge structures,” rules and procedures for making sense of 
situations and identifying the appropriate response quickly. Such 
structures provide shortcuts that enable individuals to identify the 
type of challenge they face efficiently, focus their attention on the 
kind of information needed for that sort of situation, and invoke an 
applicable rule of behavior swiftly. These structures include formal 
“top-down” rules, embodied in standard operating procedures, 
handbooks, and organization charts.116 They also include “bottom-up” 
rules developed on the ground through the evolution of informal 
routines and rules of thumb. 
Although the importance of top-down rules may be more self-
evident, bottom-up routines promote efficiency in a variety of 
important ways. First, they transform lessons learned from previous 
decisions—successful and unsuccessful—into rules for identifying 
similar situations quickly and providing a regularized response.117 By 
storing firm knowledge in this way, routines eliminate the need to 
 
 115. See Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, supra note 7, at 451, 489–90 
(discussing this division of responsibilities in the context of environmental regulation). 
 116. RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 134 
(Blackwell Publishers 1992) (1963) (“These rules are the focus for control within the firm; they 
are the result of a long-run adaptive process by which the firm learns; they are the short-run 
focus for decision making within the organization.”). 
 117. James P. Walsh, Managerial and Organizational Cognition: Notes from a Trip Down 
Memory Lane, 6 ORG. SCI. 280, 281 (1995); see also Michael D. Cohen & Paul Bacdayan, 
Organizational Routines Are Stored as Procedural Memory: Evidence from a Laboratory Study, 
5 ORG. SCI. 554, 555 (1994) (“[Routines] store organizational experience in a form that allows 
the organization to rapidly transfer that experience to new situations.”). See generally Markus C. 
Becker, Organizational Routines: A Review of the Literature, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 643 
(2004) (reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on routines). 
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reinvent the wheel, and “allow reuse of solutions to problems.”118 
Second, the knowledge encoded in routines guides effective 
decisionmaking in nonroutine situations. Because they convey more 
nuanced information than formal top-down rules, routines are useful 
in identifying familiar elements of ill-defined situations, thereby 
providing behavioral cues for interpreting and solving ambiguous 
problems.119 Third, learning from new experiences permits firm 
routines to adapt incrementally to change based on continuous 
environmental feedback. “Such experiential learning is often 
adaptively rational. That is, it allows organizations to find good, even 
optimal, rules for many choices they are likely to face.”120 
2. Overcoming Environmental Uncertainty.  Organizational 
structures further provide means for efficient decisionmaking in the 
face of changing and uncertain situations outside the firm. No 
organization is self-sufficient. To survive, firms require information 
and resources from, and therefore must enter into exchanges with, the 
external environment. A manufacturing firm, for example, requires 
external information about customer demands, technological 
advancements, and the behavior of competitors. It also looks to the 
environment for inputs to production such as raw materials, labor, 
and production processes and machinery, as well as for markets for 
outputs. The more imperfect the information accessible to firms, the 
greater the uncertainty in their environment.121 And the more firms 
need external resources, the greater their dependence on the 
environment.122 
But firms are not merely inactive bodies affected by external 
forces. Rather, as a rich sociological literature (which has not 
attracted much attention by legal scholars) describes, firms respond to 
and influence their environments by organizing through rational and 
 
 118. MARCH, SCHULZ & ZHOU, supra note 110, at 186 (“[O]rganizations confront internal 
and external problems, draw inferences from their experiences in those confrontations, and 
encode the inferences in rules. Lessons encoded in rules represent knowledge about solutions to 
problems found in the past. Rules retain knowledge and allow reuse of solutions to problems.”). 
 119. March, supra note 48, at 18 (stating that rules that suggest behavior in situations 
according to the decisionmaker’s identity “may be developed through experience, learned from 
others, or generalized from similar situations”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. J.D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 9 (1967). 
 122. See JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF 
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 51–52 (1978). 
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efficient administrative and knowledge structures.123 This adaptivity 
should, however, be of primary interest to regulators, because it 
influences interactions with every aspect of the environment, 
including regulation. 
Specifically, organizations make purposive efforts to reduce 
environmental uncertainty and dependence. They may make internal 
changes such as adapting their information systems so as to reduce 
uncertainty, diversifying technologies and processes so as to limit 
dependence on particular resources, or altering their pattern of 
management and human relations to better attract needed workers 
and other relationships. As to the latter, for example, institutional 
theorists emphasize that firms, through a process of “institutional 
isomorphism,”124 adopt structures and practices from other 
organizations like competitors, unions, professions, and trade 
associations that are considered “legitimate”125 and which therefore 
attract environmental partners to work with them.126 Moreover, 
organizations may also take steps to extend control over external 
exchanges that are critical to their operations by altering the 
environment through mergers,127 or by co-option128: attempting to 
manage those exchanges through long-term relationships over which 
they can exercise significant control. Thus, by a combination of 
internal and external measures, organizations work to shape their 
relations with the environment efficiently, by increasing control over 
interorganizational exchanges and reducing the power of 
environmental forces over the organization. 
Firms, then, organize not only through internal structures and 
rules intended to promote efficiency, but also by creating filters 
through which complex environments can be understood and, in some 
instances, controlled. 
 
 123. In sociological terms, environments not only act on particular organizations, they are 
“enacted” by them. KARL E. WEICK, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZING 63–71 (1969). 
 124. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150 
(1983). 
 125. Id. at 152. 
 126. See W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors, in 
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY 129, 140 (John W. Meyer & W. 
Richard Scott eds., 1983) (“Institutional sectors are characterized by the elaboration of rules and 
requirements to which individual organizations must conform if they are to receive support and 
legitimacy from the environment.”). 
 127. See PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 122, at 114–15. 
 128. Id. at 161–65. 
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B. The Weaknesses of Efficient Organization: Accountability 
Problems in Firm Decisionmaking 
To this point, the account of decisionmaking in firms suggests 
that the compliance paradigm’s model of firm behavior might need no 
revision. If firms indeed successfully organize themselves to overcome 
individual shortcomings and achieve complex firmwide goals 
(including successful compliance with legal mandates) then perhaps 
the traditional modes of regulatory control—using top-down 
encouragement and incentives to encourage bottom-up 
implementation of legal mandates—requires little supplementation. 
The firm’s sources of strength, however, are also its 
weaknesses.129 Indeed, the same processes that coordinate individual 
decisions efficiently in many circumstances can also create predictable 
decisionmaking pathologies in others. These cognitively rooted 
pathologies are particularly pronounced when decisions involve the 
pursuit of an externally imposed goal (such as a regulatory norm) that 
creates tension with other objectives (such as competitiveness or 
profit making) around which efficient firms structure their focus. 
Indeed, in the context of regulatory decisionmaking, these 
pathologies can produce decisions that are both irrational and 
contrary to the public norm. Moreover, because these pathologies 
result from decision processes buried deep within firms, they are 
virtually unreviewable. Accordingly, they pose a problem for the very 
values about which administrative accountability is most concerned. 
1. Decisionmaking Pathologies in Efficient Organizations.  Part 
II.A describes the role of organizational and knowledge structures in 
streamlining decisionmaking within organizations. These structures 
reflect choices about which factors deserve decisionmakers’ focus, 
and which do not. These efficient arrangements themselves create 
predictable decisionmaking pathologies. Specifically, they sometimes 
foster decisions uninformed by pertinent information, and create 
insensitivity to risk, in part because of adaptive responses that 
camouflage important threats. 
 
 129. Diane Vaughan, The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster, 25 
ANN. REV. SOC. 271, 274 (1999) (“[T]he same characteristics of a system that produce the bright 
side will regularly provoke the dark side from time to time.”). 
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a. Uninformed Decisions.  The specialization and division of 
labor critical to efficient firm organization creates information 
asymmetries intentionally.130 Top managers possess more (or 
exclusive) information about the firm’s broad goals, yet only 
generalized knowledge about the activities of different subunits. By 
contrast, employees working in subunits are ignorant of many firm 
priorities and concerns, yet possess superior knowledge about a range 
of issues, including production processes, customer interactions, 
product market trends, and technological challenges. 
This segmentation of knowledge, therefore, promotes efficiency 
especially well with respect to ongoing operations that are central to 
the achievement of recognized firm purposes. Pertinent information 
about firm and subgroup goals must be communicated downward 
from the few to the many, while localized knowledge must be 
transferred upward, or horizontally across units. Yet deriving 
efficiency from knowledge segmentation requires managers to 
maximize necessary information flow while devoting the fewest 
resources to it. This in turn favors systems geared to transmitting 
types of information that are easily codifiable, arise repeatedly, and 
relate to the firm’s or subgroup’s core mission. 
Accordingly, downward communication works well when 
managers can easily integrate information into common job 
instructions,131 convey firm and subgroup priorities through repeated 
behavior,132 and embed messages about those priorities in formal 
incentive structures. Similarly, information is most amenable to 
efficient upward communication when it is familiar to supervisors, 
and can be easily filtered and edited, condensed and summarized. 
Communication systems that prioritize efficiency, however, are 
less effective in ensuring that information about unanticipated issues, 
unfamiliar events and changing circumstances reaches appropriate 
decisionmakers, or will be recognized as relevant even by those with 
access to it. For the reasons discussed in Part II.A, for example, 
 
 130. RICHARD H. HALL, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES 169 
(8th ed. 2002) (“If the total rationale for all actions were known to all members, the potential 
for chaos would be high, since communication overload would quickly occur.”). 
 131. See generally id. at 168–70 (discussing downward communication, including direct 
orders, job descriptions, and formal performance feedback); DANIEL KATZ & ROBERT L. 
KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 440–43 (2d ed. 1978) (same). 
 132. HALL, supra note 130, at 169–70 (discussing, among other things, “attempts to 
indoctrinate subordinates into accepting and believing in the organization’s (or the subunit’s) 
goals”). 
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communication overload precludes charging lower level workers with 
concern for such low-frequency but potentially high-risk matters. 
Upward communication systems similarly obscure effective focus 
on such issues. The attention of the recipient is directed—and 
misdirected—both by the inherent skew of upward communication, 
and by the judgment and interpretation of intermediaries. As to the 
distortion of information, the technical language and classification 
schemes utilized by an organization’s formal lines of communication 
will shape the content of the transmission. These processes may not 
permit accurate transmission of knowledge that is difficult to codify, 
such as the “tacit” knowledge that is embedded in worker skills, work 
routines, and shared understandings.133 This may prevent upper-level 
managers relying on the product of those decisions from 
understanding how they were reached, and risks that may have been 
ignored. 
As to the interpretation of intermediaries, predictable cognitive 
and systemic processes will bias decisions as to what information is 
passed along in the editing process. For a variety of reasons other 
than guile, people are less likely to pass information up if it will be 
harmful to themselves or their peers. Specifically, pursuant to the 
theory of cognitive dissonance, recipients of information 
unconsciously focus on and relay only the information that reinforces 
their preexisting attitudes, while filtering out conflicting 
information.134 
In this corporate version of the children’s game of “Telephone,” 
then, serial decision makers receive partial understanding, especially 
about the possibility of unexpected negative outcomes. This effect is 
exacerbated in cases in which upward communications contain early 
tentative warnings about risks;135 in such cases a busy upper-level 
manager, in winnowing down information for attention and further 
 
 133. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, Authority in the Context of Distributed Knowledge 8 
(Danish Research Unit for Indus. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 03-08, 2002); Nicolai J. Foss, 
Firms and the Coordination of Knowledge: Some Austrian Insights 24–27 (Danish Research Unit 
for Indus. Dynamics, Working Paper No. 98-19, 1998) (discussing tacit forms of knowledge); see 
also MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION 4–20 (Anchor Books 1967) (1966) (describing 
psychological experiments and various aspects of tacit knowledge). 
 134. See Coffee, Shut-Eyed Sentry, supra note 98, at 1137 (discussing the “problems 
associated with the upward transmission of adverse information within the corporate 
hierarchy”). 
 135. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 136. 
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transmission, may focus on what are perceived as more immediate 
problems. 
This is not to say that firm communication only works in routine 
contexts demanding rigid responses. Successful firms, of course, 
effectively structure flexible systems to identify and respond to 
changing circumstances like market pressures and customer market 
demands. But it does indicate that efficient information structures 
within firms are often ill suited for the effective pursuit of solutions to 
the type of risks in which regulators are interested—especially if 
identifying and handling those risks falls outside, or is in tension with, 
core firm goals. 
b. Risk Insensitivity.  The mismatch between firm organization 
and effective regulatory decisionmaking is exacerbated by the 
knowledge structures on which firm efficiency is premised. Formally 
rational routines can bias perceptions about the information that is 
relevant to decisions. This weakness, ironically, arises from routines’ 
strengths: heuristic muscle and adaptability.136 Although heuristics 
often promote good decisions, they sometimes render decisionmakers 
insensitive to changes in context by: (1) diverting attention from 
change; and (2) by masking risk through incremental adaptation 
i. Diverting Attention from Risk and Change.  Approaching a 
situation with a decision framework in mind exacerbates the cognitive 
tendency to emphasize the familiarity of the situation and to 
downplay its ambiguous nature. As Walter Lippmann described in his 
1922 tract on the gullibility of the human mind: 
Anyone who has stood at the end of a railroad platform waiting for 
a friend, will recall what queer people he mistook for him. The 
shape of a hat, a slightly characteristic gait, evoked the vivid picture 
in his mind’s eye. In sleep a tinkle may sound like the pealing of a 
great bell; the distant stroke of a hammer like a thunderclap. For our 
constellations of imagery will vibrate to a stimulus that is perhaps 
but vaguely similar to some aspect of them. They may, in 
hallucination, flood the whole consciousness.137 
 
 136. See Dennis A. Gioia, Symbols, Scripts, and Sensemaking: Creating Meaning in the 
Organizational Experience, in THE THINKING ORGANIZATION 49, 58–59 (Warren Bennis et al. 
eds., 1986) (discussing how such structuring of information speeds problem solving by furnishing 
a basis for evaluating the information, often in ambiguous circumstances). 
 137. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 115 (1922). 
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When their thoughts are framed by a pervasive knowledge structure, 
decisionmakers recognize familiar patterns and apply rules of thumb 
they believe are appropriate for that familiar situation.138 This 
description suggests several different perceptual pathologies that 
infect the entire decisionmaking process. 
First, existing routines can inaccurately shape the 
characterization of new situations. Before decisionmakers even 
consider a course of action, they draw on the stock of existing 
organizational routines to frame their understanding of the situation 
they face. The more familiar—or cognitively “available”139—the past 
experience, the easier it is to draw on it as a lens for understanding 
new events, and the easier it is to assimilate into existing routines.140 
As discussed earlier, this availability heuristic is often very effective; 
the ease of remembering a type of event is often good evidence of its 
likelihood. Yet, because cognition accentuates familiarity and 
deemphasizes difference, it masks changes in circumstance that might 
make existing routines inappropriate. Indeed, the process of matching 
existing routines with new circumstances is sometimes so haphazard 
that leading organizational sociologists have described it as the 
“garbage can model” of decisionmaking.141 This refers to the process 
of rooting around in the garbage can of routines and applying the one 
that is first pulled out.142 
Second, existing routines can inaccurately shape the type of 
information that decisionmakers will seek out and consider. The 
cultural script called to mind shapes the type of information that 
decisionmakers believe is necessary to make a decision. This bias will 
prompt them to seek information of the type that reinforces the 
 
 138. March, supra note 48, at 21. 
 139. The “availability heuristic,” is discussed in Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11–14 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 140. Sociologist Carol Heimer further describes how the availability heuristic can distort 
rules in the opposite direction: by incorporating lessons learned from rare but memorable 
events. Heimer, supra note 16, at 7. This may create other sorts of inappropriate decisions, by 
which routine situations are treated as disasters. See, e.g., Elizabeth Goodrick & Gerald R. 
Salancik, Organizational Discretion in Responding to Institutional Practices: Hospitals and 
Cesarean Births, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 5–26 (1996) (exploring the ways in which doctors’ 
decisions to perform birth by Cesarean section are driven by organizational standards of 
procedure rather than standards of best practices). 
 141. Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 1 (1972). 
 142. Id. 
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similarity of this situation with others, and draw attention away from 
other data, such as indicia of difference.143 Thus, individuals 
unconsciously “make the problematic non-problematic”144 by 
shielding themselves from information that may disprove the 
applicability of preexisting categories to new situations, even if the 
result is to misunderstand the situation and respond inappropriately. 
The initial process of contextual interpretation is exacerbated by 
two sets of decisionmaking biases demonstrated in the behavioral 
literature on judgment and decisionmaking. The first stems from the 
unconscious cognitive strategy “to construe information and events in 
such a way as to confirm prior attitudes, beliefs, and impressions.”145 
Such “cognitive conservatism” is bolstered once a course of action has 
been commenced by a “commitment” effect, which biases subsequent 
analysis toward information that confirms the initial interpretation.146 
The second involves the “self-serving bias” by which the mind 
naturally interprets ambiguous information in a manner favorable to 
the perceiver.147 Although this cognitive effect offers benefits as a 
means of reducing anxiety and permitting functioning, it can 
subconsciously skew the perception of a situation to justify a self-
 
 143. For discussions of predecisional distortions of information, see generally Aaron L. 
Brownstein, Biased Predecision Processing, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 545 (2003); J. Edward Russo 
et al., The Distortion of Information During Decisions, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 102 (1996) (reporting findings of predecision distortions). 
 144. Vaughan, supra note 129, at 280–81. 
 145. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 135 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, 
SOCIAL COGNITION 150 (2d ed. 1991); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: 
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 167 (1980); Charles G. Lord et al., 
Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently 
Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099 (1979)). 
 146. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 142 (discussing the role of commitment in 
decisionmaking). For discussion of “commitment” or “confirmation” biases, see generally 
Jürgen Beckmann & Julius Kuhl, Altering Information to Gain Action Control: Functional 
Aspects of Human Information Processing in Decision Making, 18 J. RES. PERSONALITY 224 
(1984); Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the 
Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395 (1978); Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, Beliefs and 
Expectations as Causes of Judgmental Bias, in JUDGMENTAL FORECASTING 31 (George Wright 
& Peter Ayton eds., 1987); Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 
6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577 (1981). 
 147. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 144 (“The notion of self-serving inference is another 
fundamental construct in social cognition.”). For other discussions of self-serving bias, see Linda 
Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving 
Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); Jolls et al., supra note 99, at 1501–04; Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1172–73 
(2003). 
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interested spin, and permit the self-deception that the group interest 
is “in full consistency with their personal goals.”148 
These effects, Professor Donald Langevoort suggests, are 
important in answering the beguiling question of why public 
corporations mislead stock market investors, given that this behavior 
“simply delays the appreciation of the truth rather than avoids it 
indefinitely” and is ultimately uncovered.149 The first part of the 
answer arises from organizational response to the bounded rationality 
of individual managers who ultimately make decisions within a firm. 
An optimistic “can-do” outlook is a characteristic of an effective 
workplace. Yet such a culture exacerbates a manager’s “tendency to 
underestimate or rationalize risk,” by shaping the interpretation of 
early, and still ambiguous, information.150 Once managers have 
publicly committed to expressions of optimism, they are to some 
extent cognitively locked in to the approach. Their optimistic 
perceptions are entrenched by their commitment, and they interpret 
and winnow new information consistent with their self-interest. 
Accordingly, fewer danger signs will raise red flags. 
Finally, routines combine with structural pathologies plaguing 
upward communication to reproduce individual perceptual 
distortions throughout an organization.151 As both firm knowledge 
structures and individual cognitive biases are reproduced at each level 
of hierarchy, “[t]his more subtle winnowing and revisionism is 
repeated at each relay point, with predictable effects on the final 
message.”152 By Professor Langevoort’s account, systemic skewing of 
information can result “not only (or even so much) by conscious 
distortion, but also by biased interpretation” up the communication 
ladder.153 
ii. Masking Risk Through Incremental Adaptation: The “Nut 
Island Effect.”154  Firm routines, moreover, mask change by adapting 
to it. While the evolution of rules to compensate for new challenges 
 
 148. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 144. 
 149. Id. at 106. 
 150. Id. at 141. 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 133–35. 
 152. Langevoort, supra note 8, at 147–48. 
 153. Id. at 147. 
 154. Paul F. Levy, The Nut Island Effect: When Good Teams Go Wrong, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Mar. 2001, at 51. The following description of the Nut Island episode is taken entirely from this 
article. 
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and circumstances can be efficient, it can also have the effect of 
moving the baseline measure of usual behavior, and obscuring the 
means to gauge deviation from previous norms. Routinized 
decisionmaking both veils the existence of risks, and promotes 
decisions that, because they are guided by logic inappropriate to the 
context, create additional risk. 
The process by which Boston Harbor’s Nut Island sewage 
treatment plant degraded water quality for decades illustrates the 
ways in which formally rational organizational structures and routines 
can promote substantively irrational decisions. The plant was 
operated by a state agency subunit, and was staffed by a cohesive and 
hardworking staff that had overcome inefficient internal disputes by 
developing a culture emphasizing cooperation and teamwork. A 
focused, tight-knit group that eliminated “‘squeaky wheels’”155 on 
staff, they were, in the words of the state agency director, “every 
manager’s dream team.”156 
Through conversations and budgetary decisions, management 
conveyed a streamlined goal to the unit—keep the facility running 
and on budget—and the team focused on the demanding task without 
distraction. They developed standard operating procedures and “rules 
of thumb,”157 to maintain plant operations at low cost. 
Adapting to circumstances, the rules of thumb were modified as 
the team learned from experience. As the pumps at the core of the 
plant degraded, the Nut Islanders increased the amount of lubricant 
used, which kept the machines operational. As they learned what 
level of wastewater grit would choke the aeration tanks, they limited 
plant inflows to a manageable level. When they observed that 
particularly heavy inflows precluded full treatment of the material, 
they made sure to treat the wastewater with chlorine to eliminate 
remaining pathogens, and pipe it out to sea. And they developed 
routines for adding alkali to tanks when sample readings indicated 
unusually high acidity. 
Over time, however, it turned out that these adaptive procedures 
simply masked risk, rather that addressing it. The plant ultimately 
released the oil used on the machines into the harbor. The lubrication 
routine is a suspected cause of the high concentration of oil in harbor 
 
 155. Id. at 55. 
 156. Id. at 51. 
 157. Id. at 58. 
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sediment. It also diverted attention away from other solutions, such as 
asking managers for extra maintenance funding. Reducing grit by 
limiting wastewater inflows resulted in the diversion of other 
untreated waste directly into the harbor. The diversions were not 
recorded as plant overflows because they had never actually entered 
the facility in the first place. By adding chlorine to prevent untreated 
wastewater from ending up in the harbor, they released an 
environmental contaminant that kills marine life and destroys fragile 
shore ecosystems. And by controlling acidity with alkali, they never 
had to deal with the underlying causes of the acid variances. 
Throughout, busy upper management was reassured by Nut Island’s 
“patina of efficiency,” and focused on “business that seemed more 
pressing.”158 
c. Combining Pathologies.  Professor Langevoort’s account of 
noncompliance with securities disclosure requirements and the case 
of the “Nut Island Effect” provide vivid examples of how structural 
and perceptual pathologies work in tandem to distort firm 
decisionmaking. The decisionmakers’ motivations were not unlawful. 
Indeed, in the case of the Nut Islanders, their commitment was 
particularly laudable. The organizational cultures reflected exactly 
the traits—focus, cohesion, cooperation—that can promote an 
effective workplace. The work and reporting routines were formally 
rational in light of subgroup tasks, and embodied organizational 
learning. Yet the organizations’ knowledge structures prevented 
decisionmakers from recognizing signs of risk and danger by 
assimilating them into preexisting beliefs and familiar frameworks. 
The prevailing cultures inhibited communication upward by those in 
the best position to question standard operating procedures. And 
structural secrecy permitted monitors to filter out troubling indicators 
and rely only on positive signals that conformed to existing 
perceptions. 
2. Efficient Firm Decisionmaking and Accountability Problems 
in the Exercise of Regulatory Discretion.  Such decisionmaking 
pathologies go to the heart of the effective exercise of regulatory 
discretion. By this account, decisions are not only unresponsive to the 
public goals delegated to the firm, but can be literally arbitrary, in 
 
 158. Id. at 59. 
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that they are reached because of unconscious and systemic factors 
that neither firm managers nor individual decisionmakers intend to 
matter. Moreover, the pathological processes responsible for these 
irrational decisions, to a large extent, evade external review. The 
flawed logic on which they rest are hidden in systems and in 
instinctive responses that appear to be rationally ordered, but are 
difficult to communicate and hard to monitor. When affected by 
structural decisionmaking pathologies, then, firms’ exercise of 
regulatory discretion threatens each element of decisionmaking 
accountability. 
a. Failures of Rationality.  Predictable firm decisionmaking 
pathologies suggest the ways in which traditional models of control 
will fail in promoting the rational exercise of regulatory discretion. 
Rules developed in prior contexts guide behavior in new situations 
for which they may be inappropriate; relevant information is ignored 
in favor of familiar but unimportant guideposts; the knowledge 
necessary for informed judgment may be trapped so that it never 
reaches the appropriate decisionmaker; and the vigorous and 
purposeful pursuit of reasonable ends may subvert ultimate goals. 
These pathologies, moreover, impede judgment most predictably 
when the matter at issue is the type of greatest concern to regulation: 
the accurate assessment of the type of risk and change not only likely 
to affect an individual subunit or even a single firm, but to impose 
costly externalities on product or capital markets or threaten health 
and safety more broadly. 
These sorts of decisionmaking pathologies indicate, at least, that 
reliance on bottom-up commitment by firms for vigorous pursuit of 
regulatory ends will undermine the type of rational decisions for 
which administrative law holds delegated decisionmakers 
accountable. Some firm decisions will predictably, in the words of the 
Supreme Court, have “relied on factors which Congress [or agencies] 
ha[ve] not intended,” have “entirely failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem [or] offered an explanation for its decision that 
runs counter to the evidence,” or be “so implausible that it could not 
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of [decisionmaker] 
expertise.”159 In other words, the exercise of regulated firm discretion, 
by this account, will literally be arbitrary—reached “without 
 
 159. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(defining the standard for arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking). 
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consideration or adjustment with reference to principles, 
circumstances, or significance . . . [and] decisive but unreasoned”160—
or capricious: simply “freakish.”161 
Yet this account also signals the insufficiency of existing top-
down models of control. The behavioral account of firm 
decisionmaking indicates that the arbitrary exercise of regulatory 
discretion may be particularly resistant to control tools rooted in 
rational models. Indeed, the irrational decisions which trigger 
accountability concerns in this context arise specifically from 
purposive and adaptive processes geared to promoting coherent and 
efficient outcomes. The individuals structuring and participating in 
pathological decision processes often already believe that their 
behavior is rational, and that they are pursuing compliance with legal 
norms appropriately. In the words of one former CFO brought in to 
help restructure a company after it had been convicted for financial 
fraud, “no one ever thinks they work at a company where bad things 
happen.”162 In that case, a regime that relies principally on incentives 
to prevent “bad things” from happening will be stunted by the 
inaccurate cognitive frames of decisionmakers who erroneously 
believe that the desired result has already been achieved. 
b. Failures of Responsiveness.  The behavioral model of firm 
decisionmaking, however, suggests more than arbitrariness in the 
firm’s internal pursuit of regulatory goals. It also, in two distinct ways, 
reveals particular systemic resistance to the exercise of judgment in a 
way that is accountable to externally generated regulatory goals. 
First, the structures and routines that guide behavior within firm 
boundaries provide an interpretive lens through which external 
environmental forces, such as government regulation, are translated 
inside the firm. Specifically, the mechanisms that permit the 
successful and efficient focus on internally generated firm goals also 
adapt external directives so as to minimize conflict with existing 
routines and practices. Second, firms project their internal way of 
looking at things, and the cognitive shortcomings reflected therein, to 
other parties with whom they interact, including the actors entrusted 
 
 160. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 244 n.14 (1946) (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1945)). 
 161. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1945)). 
 162. Telephone interview with Steve Tisdell, President, The Compliance Partners, in 
Nashville, Tenn. (Sept. 27, 2004). 
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with the responsibility for oversight and accountability. In 
combination, this double distortion of regulatory imperatives raises 
concerns about regulated firms’ responsiveness to public goals. 
i. Routines and the Distortion of External Regulatory Mandates 
inside Firm Boundaries.  As described above,163 firms shape relations 
with other organizations in order to secure resources they need. 
When these relationships are initiated because of particularized 
requirements identified in a “bottom-up” way by the firm itself (such 
as the need for supplies, know-how, or customers), the sensitivity to 
environmental factors develops in a way that is both integrated into 
the firm’s existing decision processes and reflects localized firm 
knowledge, culture, and goals. 
In contrast, the integration of externally developed regulatory 
goals into existing firm routines poses greater challenges,164 for 
“[al]though adoption of new structures and practices may smooth 
interactions across organizational boundaries, it may be disruptive to 
the internal workings of the organization.”165 Regulatory aims often 
create tension with the corporate goals around which formally 
rational structures and routines have developed. For example, the 
aims on which efficient firm organization focuses will likely include 
competitiveness, cohesion, and growth, rather than the particularities 
of a regulatory regime. As a result, the established routines and 
mindsets within the firm will prompt decisionmakers to adapt 
external mandates in ways that most easily achieve the appearance of 
legitimacy, while minimizing the dislocation of existing practices. In 
this circumstance, the organizational capacity to reshape external 
rules to minimize disruption of established routines will undermine 
the efficacy of the regulation, rather than incorporate its norms. 
In the language of organizational theory, the basic “resource” 
that firms seek from regulatory compliance is the ability to signal to 
 
 163. See supra text accompanying notes 121–26. 
 164. Institutional sociologists describe the process of assimilating procedures that have 
proven successful in similar organizations as “institutional isomorphism.” DiMaggio & Powell, 
supra note 124, at 149–50. Such external structures, when imported to a new context, may not 
provide the best local fit. The divergence between local fit and borrowed institutional forms is 
particularly pronounced when the rules in question result from “coercive isomorphism,” such as 
the imposition of legal rules by a regulator. Id. at 150–51. 
 165. Carol A. Heimer, Explaining Variation in the Impact of Law: Organizations, 
Institutions, and Professions, in 15 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 29, 41 (Austin 
Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1995). 
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others outside the organization (including government enforcers, 
business partners, and the market) that their pursuit of organizational 
goals is valid. Accordingly, they incorporate certain visible indicators 
of legitimacy. Such a process often results in the “ceremonial” 
adoption of rules.166 Regulated firms incorporate structures that 
appear to prioritize the concerns of the law, but really change little 
about other activities in the organization. In the employment law 
context, for example, legal sociologists have illustrated how firms 
implement antidiscrimination protections by focusing compliance 
efforts on creating new legalistic processes. Such procedures signal 
“legality” but, because they are distinct from other firm structures, 
avoid fundamental alterations in existing workplace culture. The legal 
norm is therefore translated into the firm so that the “right to a 
nondiscriminatory workplace in effect becomes a ‘right’ to complaint 
resolution.”167 The right to complaint resolution, notes one sociologist, 
“is far more superficial and entails fewer disruptions of routines than 
would a right to a nondiscriminatory workplace.”168 
A similar process can be seen in the traditional focus on audits as 
a central means for compliance with securities regulation. While there 
is no doubt that such safeguards comprise an important component of 
comporting with legal requirements, the capacity of audits is 
necessarily limited. They explicitly focus on certain factors that can be 
measured, such as whether data is presented in a universally 
recognized manner, rather than on substantive changes to firm 
practices.169 Thus, the establishment of auditable controls often 
provides firms with ways to signal legitimacy without addressing 
deeper problems inherent in existing routines and structures. 
 
 166. John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 340–41 (1977). 
 167. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil 
Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 529 (1993); see also Lauren B. Edelman et 
al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedure as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. 
SOC. 406 (1999) (discussing how organizations “construct rational responses to law, enabled by 
‘rational myths’ . . . that are themselves modeled after the public legal order”). 
 168. Heimer, supra note 165, at 41. 
 169. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight 
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 269–70 (2004) (discussing how audits focus on 
measures that can be tested, rather than on those that are effective). See generally MICHAEL 
POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997) (tracing the explosion in 
auditing activity since the 1980s in the United Kingdom and North America to political 
demands for accountability and control). 
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The failure of externally derived regulatory goals to fully affect 
the decisions within the firm results in large part from the structural 
and perceptual pathologies within the firm. The ability of regulatory 
goals to reshape existing routines is significantly diminished if the 
implementation is assigned to a subunit that has only limited power. 
When legal rules remain one of a number of distinct and competing 
claims on decisionmakers, their effect is haphazard. Because their 
legitimacy is undermined, “it may be very difficult to produce 
decisions that generally seem as justifiable and capable of 
enforcement.”170 
ii. Extending Internal Pathologies outside Firm Boundaries.  
Organizational structures do not simply provide the filter through 
which organizations interpret their environments. They can also 
extend pathologies of firm decisionmaking across organizational 
boundaries. Professor Langevoort’s thick description of corporate 
decisionmaking describes how organizational culture and the 
resulting perceptual filters can both lead to decisions to misrepresent 
information, and prevent discovery of distortions (whether purposeful 
or unconscious) before securities misrepresentations occur. This 
phenomenon, however, is further reflected by notable failures of the 
third-party gatekeepers and intermediaries on whom the system relies 
to keep corporations accountable.171 Indeed, in the words of the 
Senate Committee Report investigating the Enron failure: 
[W]hat Committee staff discovered was deeply disturbing—not so 
much because they uncovered malfeasance or intentional 
wrongdoing on anyone’s part (although that seems to have been 
present in some cases as well), but because what emerged was a 
story of systemic and arguably catastrophic failure, a failure of all 
 
 170. Martha S. Feldman & Alan J. Levy, Effects of Legal Context on Decision Making 
Under Ambiguity, in THE LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION 109, 113 (Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies 
eds., 1994). 
 171. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304 (2004) (suggesting an “explanation for 
the wave of accounting and financial reporting irregularities that surfaced in 2001–2002: namely, 
that the gatekeepers failed. That is, the professionals who serve investors by preparing, 
verifying, or certifying corporate disclosures to the securities markets acquiesced in managerial 
fraud . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 
BUS. LAW. 1403, 1404–05 (2002) (arguing that the importance of the Enron debacle “lies [in] the 
market’s discovery that it cannot rely upon the professional gatekeepers—auditors, analysts, 
and others—whom the market has long trusted to filter, verify and assess complicated financial 
information”). 
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the watchdogs to properly discharge their appointed roles. Despite 
the magnitude of Enron’s implosion and the apparent pervasiveness 
of its fraudulent conduct, virtually no one in the multilayered system 
of controls devised to protect the public detected Enron’s problems, 
or, if they did, they did nothing to correct them or alert investors.172 
Some of this failure may be attributed to the incentive structures 
and resulting conflicts of interest that shaped the behavior of third-
party monitors. Yet research suggests that behavioral effects played a 
significant role as well. In particular, the bias toward self-serving 
interpretations of ambiguous data, which has been well documented 
in outside auditor practice,173 can facilitate the transmission of 
inaccurate information outside the bounds of the corporation. The 
increased willingness of individuals to endorse biased proposals made 
by others might also reinforce the information distortions coming out 
of the regulated firm.174 Finally, the importance that accounting firms 
place on understanding regulated firm culture, and the closeness with 
which outside auditors work with teams internal to the corporation, 
create the danger that those auditors will be subject to groupthink 
judgment dynamics as well.175 
The failure of securities analysts to serve as corporate 
malfeasance watchdogs may, at least in part, be attributable to a 
similar phenomenon. Certainly, economic motives may underlie the 
practice. Securities analysts may give false or misleading favorable 
 
 172. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, supra note 10, at 2. 
 173. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into 
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 168–70 (2000); Robert A. Prentice, The SEC 
and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 
1629–53 (2000). 
 174. See Don A. Moore et al., Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: 
Moral Seduction and Strategic Issue Cycling 17–18 (Am. Accounting Ass’n, Working Paper No. 
03-115, 2004) (discussing the phenomenon, and concluding that “[t]he current system, in which 
auditors are charged only with assessing whether or not the client’s reports comply with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, is likely to exploit the tendency to ‘go along’ with 
the actions of another even when that action raises some questions or concerns”). 
 175. David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss?: Controlling Auditor Incentives 
Through Random Selection, 53 EMORY L.J. 391, 404–05 (2004) (“[A]uditors are subject to many 
of the same cognitive biases that plague all people, and many of those biases work in favor of 
complicity with management.”); see also PriceWaterhouseCoopers Recruiting Website, 
http://www.pwcglobal.com/us/eng/careers/car-inexp/opportunities_mcs_career.html (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2006) (“You’ll work as part of a team at the client’s office—often for months at a 
time—side-by-side with the client’s staff. . . . Being on site also enables you to experience each 
client’s culture firsthand, which in turn helps us create the most appropriate solution for each 
situation.”). 
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evaluations of corporate securities in order to attract or retain the 
issuing corporations as investment banking clients. Yet research 
demonstrates an even stronger correlation between optimistic 
earnings and price forecasts and the length of time an analyst has 
covered a stock. A study of over 4,500 analysts determined that 
analysts at firms with underwriting and trading businesses are actually 
less optimistic than those at pure brokerage houses, which perform no 
underwriting.176 In contrast, “forecasts are more optimistic for analysts 
with more experience covering a stock, suggesting that over time, 
analysts develop relations with management that makes it difficult to 
be independent.”177 Thus, the watchdog failures may have been less 
attributable to economic conflicts of interests, than to shared social 
cognition.178 
In sum, the structures and routines within firms both distort 
regulatory goals within the firm, and extend such distortions outside 
the firm. This phenomenon poses systemic barriers to a firm’s 
responsiveness to regulatory goals. 
c. Failures of Reviewability.  Finally, the importance of routines 
and cognitive filters in firm decisionmaking points to a failure of 
reviewability. Because the routines that structure much firm behavior 
are often unwritten, unarticulated, and even unconscious, they are 
largely insulated from external review by administrative agencies, the 
courts, or the public. External observers unfamiliar with internal 
company workings lack the means to delve beyond formally rational 
structures. They may be able to identify the existence of efficient firm 
 
 176. See Paul Healy et al., Which Types of Analyst Firms Make More Optimistic Forecasts? 1 
(Regulatory Policy Program at the Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, 
Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. RPP-2004-08, 2004). 
 177. Id. at 6. 
 178. In her discussion of how what she refers to as “groupthink” hindered the independent 
judgment of the Enron Board of Directors, Marleen O’Connor describes a similar extension of 
firm knowledge structures across watchdog lines within the firm itself. The U.S. Senate and 
special committee reports investigating Enron’s collapse revealed that its directors “were as 
surprised as anyone by the company’s collapse,” because, through pathological decisionmaking 
within the firm, the Board “felt swept along in disregarding warning signs and believing 
irrational predictions.” Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1240–41 (2003). 
This conclusion provides an added dimension to the infamous comment of Salomon 
Smith Barney analyst Jack Grubman—celebrated for his close ties to corporate managers—that 
“what used to be a conflict is now a synergy.” ARIANNA HUFFINGTON, PIGS AT THE TROUGH: 
HOW CORPORATE GREED AND POLITICAL CORRUPTION ARE UNDERMINING AMERICA 161 
(2003). 
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organization, but they lack the logic to assess when formal structures 
might lead to pathological outcomes, or to identify such structures 
buried deep within the firm. Given these restraints, little is revealed 
about whether a firm’s discretion will ultimately be exercised in a 
responsive manner.179 
The inability of administrative agencies to review firm decisions 
meaningfully, in particular, can foster patterns of agency-firm 
interactions that threaten to eliminate the benefits of enlisting firms 
as partners in regulation in the first place. Specifically, agencies and 
firms can settle on a shared construction of externally verifiable ways 
to satisfy regulatory dictates; these shared understandings, ironically, 
may simply reproduce the very type of unthinking compliance 
behavior that regulatory delegation was intended to replace. 
When accorded discretion to implement legal mandates, 
regulated firms reasonably seek and expect reliable guidance from 
regulators.180 In the information security context, for example, private 
 
 179. Indeed, attempts to monitor strictly the exercise of discretion can actually exacerbate 
the decisionmaking pathologies they seek to uncover. The literature on cognition demonstrates 
that individuals who already have an internally generated propensity to obey the law (a “duty 
heuristic”) will unconsciously overestimate the probability of detection, and therefore perceive 
legal compliance to be in their self-interest. See John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear and 
Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 491 
(1995). Yet that research also demonstrates that such “internal motivation” can be “crowded 
out” by a system that relies only on external motivation, see, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 
Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589, 591–96 (2001), such as aggressive 
monitoring, see Langevoort, supra note 61, at 96, or threat of punishment. Specifically, 
crowding-out can diminish the sense of responsibility for decisions implementing regulation, 
reduce the inclination to share relevant private information with other decisionmakers, and 
impede identification with the legal goal. See Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation, 
Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Form 10–12 (Institute for Empirical Research in 
Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 27, 1999). More generally, antagonistic 
methods for guiding firm behavior tend to “make every interaction a contest of wills, 
encouraging defiance and resistance among even those people who are not initially inclined to 
defy or resist.” Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law-Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social 
Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 371 (2001); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION 49–50 (1995) (examining empirical evidence suggesting that level of 
punishment is inversely related to level of law-abiding behavior). Rather than encourage the 
accountable exercise of judgment, such approaches threaten contrary results. 
 180. See, e.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
ACCOUNTANT, DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, MANAGEMENT’S REPORT ON INTERNAL 
CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE 
ACT PERIODIC REPORTS FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (revised Oct. 6, 2004), 
http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/controlfaq1004.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (answering 
“frequently asked questions” about the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
01__BAMBERGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:06 PM 
434 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:377 
firms are “hungry for a streamlined compliance blueprint.”181 Such 
appetite is neither surprising nor inherently problematic. Indeed, 
rule-of-law values demand that law—particularly law enforceable by 
criminal sanction—include sufficient detail to provide fair notice of 
prohibited conduct,182 and policy studies emphasize the role of agency 
advice in facilitating compliance with complex regulatory regimes.183 
The development of detailed guidance by agencies, however, can 
exacerbate the problems of routinized decisionmaking. Agencies, like 
any other organization, may themselves suffer from similar 
pathologies of routinization. The organizational development of 
acceptable conditions for compliance freezes those procedures in 
place; commitment to static routines then shapes regulators’ 
understandings of what is acceptable, and filters out ways in which 
those routines may be insufficient in varied or changing 
circumstances. The more formal the guidance, moreover, the greater 
the procedural and resource barriers to revisiting accepted routines, 
which increases their “ossification”184 and resistance to change. 
The resulting dynamic of “organizations regulating 
organizations,” moreover, exacerbates the poor exercise of firm 
discretion. Agency attempts to give content to broad delegations runs 
into the same problems of rule-bound governance that prompted the 
wide scope of regulatory discretion initially. Once agencies settle on 
the specific behavior they believe will constitute compliance, a similar 
mindset is likely to be integrated into firm practices and cultures. The 
feedback loop between firms and regulators becomes a one-time 
event, resulting in a shared knowledge structure that guides and 
entrenches the behavior of each. 
 
 181. Bill Brenner, RSA 2006: A one-size-fits-all approach to compliance? (Feb. 10, 2006), 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci1165786,00.html (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2006) (attributing observation to Chrisan Herrod, Chief Security Officer of the 
SEC). 
 182. See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999) (holding Chicago gang 
congregation ordinance unconstitutional because it failed to provide fair notice of prohibited 
conduct or establish minimal guidelines for enforcement). 
 183. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 18, at 831 (urging a policy focus on ways 
regulators can increase compliance assistance). 
 184. Administrative law scholars have, especially in the context of rulemaking, explored a 
widespread concern that ossification has resulted in the failure of the administrative state to 
govern efficiently and responsively. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify 
Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60–62 (1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying 
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997). 
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This phenomenon, in turn, emasculates administrative agency 
review as an accountability mechanism for enhancing reasoned and 
thoughtful pursuit of regulatory goals. When decisionmakers know in 
advance the particular views of their reviewer, they behave as 
“cognitive miser[s],” “avoid[ing] mental calculations that require 
sustained attention, effort or computing power.”185 Their decisions 
will be governed by an “acceptability heuristic,” whereby they will 
settle on socially acceptable behavior without considering 
alternatives, or interpreting complex or contradictory environmental 
information. Once firm decisionmakers know the particular rules for 
reaching a regulatory safe harbor, and once those approaches have 
been integrated into corporate understandings of the compliance 
environment, agency review is likely to exacerbate, rather than 
ameliorate, pathologies of routinized behavior. 
The failure of existing control tools to prevent unresponsive 
ceremonial adoption of legal forms is aggravated by weak agency 
review mechanisms and threatens the efficacy of regulation through 
internal compliance structures.186 By permitting routinized “check the 
box” compliance to supplant the reasoned exercise of discretion, 
dominant models of regulatory control permit firm decisionmaking to 
be subverted by predictable pathologies that undermine the range of 
public law accountability norms. 
A deeper understanding of organizational decisionmaking 
suggests: (1) that administrative law must pursue additional 
accountability tools to guide the regulatory decisions of firms, just as 
it does with agencies; and (2) that these tools must reflect actual 
decision structures and processes. The next Part, accordingly, 
explores the lessons that the literature on firm decisionmaking offers 
for remedying decision pathologies, and suggests ways to integrate 
these lessons into mechanisms for rendering private regulators 
accountable. 
 
 185. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability: The Neglected Social Context of Judgment 
and Choice, in 7 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 297, 311 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. 
Cummings eds., 1985). 
 186. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003) (arguing that these models of regulation “do not deter prohibited 
conduct within firms and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both 
market legitimacy and reduced legal liability”); see also Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational 
Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571 (2005) (arguing that 
organizations have perverse incentives to implement ineffective compliance programs). 
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III.  ADMINISTRATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR REGULATED FIRMS 
If traditional methods for controlling the exercise of regulatory 
discretion by private firms prove incomplete, how might policymakers 
develop additional tools to render firm regulatory discretion 
accountable? One way would be to apply the specific accountability 
mechanisms that govern administrative agencies. Indeed, a growing 
body of scholarship has explored applying such mechanisms to 
standard-setting bodies like the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN),187 and private government 
contractors that administer social services, prisons, and other 
programs.188 
Such accountability tools, however—including public notice and 
comment, broad judicial review, and the expansion of the state action 
doctrine to cover the administration of public programs by private 
actors—are ill suited to manage regulated firm behavior. They would 
impose great costs with little payoff.189 
Specifically, opening firm processes generally to public comment 
and broad judicial review would impose costly and time-consuming 
procedures on every regulated firm, with even more detrimental 
consequences for the broader economy. It would strain both privacy 
commitments rooted in constitutional property protections, and 
policies of corporate secrecy intended to encourage vigorous 
competition and promote innovation. Such a fundamental policy shift, 
even if politically tenable, would endanger the very private-sector 
initiative that broad regulatory delegation seeks to harness for public 
ends. 
Furthermore, such mechanisms would be largely ineffective. As 
an initial matter, concerns about regulated firm discretion fall below 
the state action doctrine’s constitutional radar. Moreover, judicial 
standards arising from the APA and tailored to agencies are simply 
inapplicable in the private firm context. Judicial review separated 
from evaluative principle offers no logic to guide the external 
 
 187. See A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around 
the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17 (2000) (critiquing the formation and use of 
ICANN as a means to avoid public rulemaking). 
 188. See Metzger, supra note 13. 
 189. See generally Freeman, Private Role, supra note 12, at 593 (discussing examples of 
contexts in which private actors participate in regulation that “underscore the limitations of 
traditional accountability mechanisms and suggest alternative incentives, checks, controls, and 
monitoring tools that might supplement or supplant them”). 
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monitoring of the substance of firm decisions. Finally, a broad public 
comment requirement provides a blunt instrument, inapt for guiding 
regulatory delegation. The costly procedures would neither further 
the regulatory goal of enlisting firms to tap into their superior 
knowledge about the workings of their company, nor target 
pathologies that lead to irrational decisions. 
The mismatch between certain traditional accountability 
mechanisms and the regulated firm context, however, does not mean 
that administrative law is silent as to how firm decisionmaking might 
better be guided by public law norms. Indeed, a number of scholars, 
led by Jody Freeman, have suggested a version of accountability that 
varies according to the specific “administrative arrangement,” and is 
tailored according to a context-specific assessment of the dangers 
inherent in a particular regulatory structure.190 
This Part takes up Freeman’s suggestion in the context of 
regulatory delegations to private firms. Guided by the accountability 
model’s emphasis on rationality, responsiveness and reviewability as 
pertinent measures when observable outcomes are unavailable or 
insufficient for assessing discretion’s exercise, this Part suggests 
frameworks for thinking about regulated firm behavior in light of the 
particular accountability shortcomings discussed in Part II. More 
specifically, it first examines the ways in which decisionmaking 
pathologies that distort the effects of the regulatory environment 
might be mitigated by that same environment. It then suggests three 
ways in which mitigation tools can be integrated into the regulatory 
structure, with particular reference to regulatory initiatives, like the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that show promise as accountability tools, and 
others that do not. 
This Part does not claim to offer a complete or exclusive 
accountability schema for regulated firm decisionmaking. It addresses 
only the cognitively rooted threats to administrative law values in 
firm decisionmaking, and is intended only to supplement other 
approaches. Moreover, it only provides examples of the types of 
“cognitive accountability” tools that might be employed by 
 
 190. Id. at 665 (“The appropriate response to shared governance instead requires highly 
contextual, specific analyses of both the benefits and the dangers of different administrative 
arrangements, together with a willingness to look for informal, nontraditional, and 
nongovernmental mechanisms for ensuring accountability.”); see also id. at 580 (discussing how 
the application of the state action doctrine fails as a general accountability mechanism because 
it does not “tailor procedural protections to the specific threats posed by a particular regulatory 
regime in which both public and private decisionmakers play a significant role”). 
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regulators. Yet these examples suggest more general approaches that 
can guide administrative agencies when integrating cognitive 
understandings into the regulation of private decision processes, and 
policymakers in more accurately gauging the costs and benefits of 
regulation. 
A. Administrative Law Lessons and Decision Pathologies 
As discussed in Part I, administrative law responds to the 
stumbling blocks inhibiting good agency decisionmaking by including 
a variety of differently situated actors in the decision structure, 
thereby using outside influences on internal decision processes to 
promote public norms. This focus on process, rather than just 
substantive outcomes, further provides a measure by which external 
parties can assess the administrative exercise of discretion, permitting 
meaningful review through at least some modicum of decisional 
transparency. In sum, administrative law relies on relationships and 
interactions across organizational boundaries to shape regulatory 
decisions within them. 
Research into the ways in which firms overcome decisionmaking 
pathologies suggests the promise of such an approach for regulatory 
delegation. Although firm structures generate systemic pulls toward 
irrationality in decisionmaking, corporate behavior does not usually 
end in disaster. That is because decision structures, while robust, are 
not static. Firms, and the individuals within them, learn. Their 
routines change and their culture develops, often because of—rather 
then in spite of—relationships with their environments. 
The literature on social cognition identifies two types of 
organizational learning. The first, “single-loop” learning, refers to the 
type of learning associated with the adaptive side of firms. In a single-
loop process, organizations respond to experience by adjusting their 
routines and standard operating procedures in light of unanticipated 
mismatches between expected or desired outcomes and reality.191 
Decisionmaking evolution at Nut Island,192 for example, reflected this 
sort of learning. As in that case, although single-loop adaptation is 
often efficient—and usually promotes formal decision rationality—it 
can ultimately lead to the decisionmaking pathologies that distort 
internal responses to external regulation. 
 
 191. CHRIS ARGYRIS ET AL., ACTION SCIENCE 85–88 (1985). 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 154–58. 
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In contrast, “double-loop” learning describes learning at a 
“meta” level. Such learning occurs when decisionmakers recognize at 
a conscious level, and then affirmatively question and challenge, the 
routines, assumptions and understandings that inform their 
decisions.193 This type of learning, which creates the mental distance 
necessary to identify and address cognitively rooted decisionmaking 
pathologies, can sometimes be initiated by actors within 
organizational boundaries. But because those actors’ perceptions are 
usually shaped by the same shortsighted knowledge structures they 
hope to uncover and transform, internal change alone can be elusive. 
The greatest possibility for learning, therefore, results when external 
forces disrupt insular ways of thinking. 
The remainder of this Part first draws on the organizational 
learning literature to identify tools that hold promise for overcoming 
decisionmaking accountability failures. It then suggests ways that 
those tools could be combined to improve rationality, responsiveness, 
and reviewability through regulatory design, restructuring relations 
with third-party gatekeepers, and rethinking the interactions between 
regulated firms and the agency. 
B. Identifying Accountability Tools 
1. Tools for Enhancing Decisionmaking Rationality.  Just as 
individual cognition provides the basis for understanding firm 
behavior, it also grounds theories of firm learning. The administrative 
and knowledge structures that govern organizational behavior are 
developed to simplify the decisions made by individuals with limited 
attentional and perceptual facility. Yet these very simplification tools 
are the source of irrational decisions. Thus, for firm behavior to 
change, certain decisions must be made more complex. At certain 
junctures, individuals must be directed away from decision heuristics, 
their attention focused on the task at hand, and their perception 
attuned to the unfamiliar rather than the recognizable. 
External shocks, of the type that occur naturally in the market, 
provide the model for purposive attempts to improve decisionmaking 
through direct measures. Whereas routines, by means of the Nut 
Island Effect, mask gradual change through adaptation, rapid 
 
 193. ARGYRIS, supra note 191, at 85–88. 
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environmental transformations—external shocks—focus attention.194 
A bankruptcy within a sector, the merger of a competitor, or the 
introduction of a new product in an industry all serve to shake up 
existing assumptions and focus attention on the resulting competitive 
effects. By creating new and memorable events, they also alter the 
effect of the “availability heuristic,” supplementing the closed set of 
information that had previously shaped the way decisionmakers made 
sense of situations with additional considerations that force routines 
to be consciously examined and reworked. 
a. Assigning Responsibility.  The simplest way to reproduce the 
attentional effect of an external shock is to instruct a decisionmaker, 
at a discrete point in time, to focus on a particular decision. 
Psychological evidence suggests that even self-induced reflection can 
change one’s perception of a situation,195 as can explicit recognition of 
the knowledge structures governing one’s outlook.196 Indeed, 
“[s]imply thinking about an attitude object has been shown to affect 
the representation of that object in memory.”197 
Making individuals personally accountable for tasks signals the 
importance of the task and fosters a sense of responsibility for the 
outcome.198 In such circumstances, decisionmakers employ more 
analytic and complex judgment strategies, and perceive the decisions 
under consideration to be more significant and less reversible should 
 
 194. Martti Ala-Härkönen & David Rutenberg, The Dawn of Organizational Learning in 
the Mining Industry, 19 RESOURCES POL. 205, 211–12 (1993) (discussing how a German mining 
company used the “confusion and fatigue of an external shock as an opportunity for strategic 
change”). 
 195. See Murray G. Millar & Abraham Tesser, Thought-Induced Attitude Change: The 
Effects of Schema Structure and Commitment, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 259 (1986); 
Angelo C. Valenti & Abraham Tesser, On the Mechanism of Thought-Induced Attitude Change, 
9 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 17 (1981). 
 196. Walsh, supra note 117, at 293–94, discusses Colin Eden, On the Nature of Cognitive 
Maps, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 261 (1992) and Rex Mitchell, Team-Building by Disclosure of Internal 
Frames of Reference, 22 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 15 (1986). Professor Eden discusses how 
cognitive mapping “may act as a tool to facilitate decision-making, problem-solving, and 
negotiation within the context of organizational intervention.” Eden, supra, at 262. 
 197. Walsh, supra note 117, at 283 (citation omitted). 
 198. Chris Argyris, Good Communication That Blocks Learning, HARV. BUS. REV., July–
Aug. 1994, at 77–78 (discussing the importance of individual accountability, and communication 
structures that surface, rather than mask, “the kinds of deep and potentially threatening or 
embarrassing information” that leads to change, in organizational learning). 
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they turn out incorrect.199 When it is made clear at the point of action 
that an individual is actively responsible for a decision whether to 
commit fraud, for example (rather than whether to permit fraud), the 
likelihood of misrepresentation decreases significantly.200 
b. Expanding the Types of Information Considered.  Prompting 
decisionmakers to collect information systematically before making a 
decision,201 to consider types of information they would not usually 
contemplate, or to take account of “counterfactual” approaches, can 
also mediate the biasing effects of preexisting knowledge structures.202 
In particular, the literature on organizational learning has identified 
intrafirm benchmarking measures as particularly effective tools in 
prompting decisionmakers to take account of information that their 
knowledge structures might otherwise filter out. Intrafirm 
comparisons overcome the effects of structural secrecy by transferring 
information between subunits, and by comparing the performance of 
subunits across the firm, which makes subunit routines more visible.203 
They permit the operation of several other debiasing techniques, such 
as making knowledge structures more explicit, and informing 
decisionmakers throughout the firm of data that may refute as well as 
confirm existing beliefs. Indeed, benchmarking programs have been 
identified as a particularly powerful means of prompting 
 
 199. P.W. McAllister et al., The Contingency Model for the Selection of Decision Strategies, 
24 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 228 (1979); Tetlock, supra note 185, at 316. 
 200. See Steven T. Schwartz & David E. Wallin, Behavioral Implications of Information 
Systems on Disclosure Fraud, 14 BEHAV. RES. ACCT. 197 (2002) (comparing the decisions to 
issue fraudulent disclosures, and to allow an information system to issue fraudulent reports at a 
given rate, and concluding that “making subjects more closely involved with the disclosure 
reduced the rate of fraudulent disclosures by 30 percent”). 
 201. Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate 
for Individual Shortcomings, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 13 (1998) (discussing processes in 
organizations ranging from Motorola to hospitals). 
 202. See, e.g., Laura J. Kray & Adam D. Galinsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual 
Mind-sets: Increasing the Search for Disconfirmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORG. 
BEHAV. HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 69 (2003); O’Connor, supra note 178, at 1241 (proposing 
the establishment of the rotating role of “devil’s advocate” on corporate boards in an attempt to 
avert “Groupthink”); Heimer, supra note 16, at 27 (“A practical adaptation to regulatory risk 
and the regulatory cost of continuous innovation, then, that still addresses the human incapacity 
to imagine alternatives is an insistence that an organization consider at least one or a small 
number of alternatives.”). 
 203. See Carla O’Dell & C. Jackson Grayson, If Only We Knew What We Know: 
Identification and Transfer of Internal Best Practices, 40 CAL. MGMT. REV. 154, 157 (1998) 
(contrasting internal benchmarking with “[o]rganizational structures that promote ‘silo’ 
behavior”). 
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decisionmakers to replace routinized identification and interpretation 
of information with what has been called “mindful scanning” of the 
environment. Benchmarking data can affect “mindfulness” in the 
approach to knowledge; it prompts individuals “to include that which 
is learned from experimentation on the fringes of current 
operations.”204 This information, which dominant knowledge 
structures might mask as an anomaly, may be the best indicator of 
change, risk, or opportunity facing an organization.205 
The benefits of spurring mindful individual cognitive processes 
can be leveraged by the relevant decisionmaker’s power within the 
firm. Research on the decision process development suggests that a 
leader’s articulation of a new vision for an organization or team can 
provide the type of altered information environment that changes 
knowledge structures more broadly.206 Moreover, when individuals 
central to the chain of command are prompted to think differently, 
they can more easily integrate their new learning into existing firm 
decision structures, which heightens its legitimacy and chance of 
success within the firm.207 Further, as discussed in the following 
subsection, mindful decisionmakers—particularly if they have access 
to other firm leaders—can widely influence decisionmaking 
indirectly, by exposing others to a competing structure for making 
sense of circumstances.208 
2. Tools for Enhancing Responsiveness to Public Norms.  
Indirect means of focusing attention and broadening perception 
 
 204. C. Marlene Fiol & Edward J. O’Connor, Waking Up! Mindfulness in the Face of 
Bandwagons, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 54, 63 (2003). 
 205. See Karl E. Wieck et al., Organizing for High Reliability, 21 ORG. BEHAV. 81, 92 (1999) 
(discussing how mindful organizations create processes to view localized failure as a sign of 
generalizable problems). 
 206. Daniel J. Isenberg, Drugs and Drama: The Effects of Two Dramatic Events in a 
Pharmaceutical Company on Managers’ Cognitions, COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Spring 1987, at 43 
(discussing instances in which dramatic events cause managers to focus on problem-definition 
and problem solving and lead to revised images of individual and organizational abilities). 
 207. See Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, The Legalistic Organization: Definitions, 
Dimensions and Dilemmas, 4 ORG. SCI. 345 (1993) (contrasting the success of organizational 
rules that are easily included in the existing chain of command with those that violate routinized 
order and the chain of command). 
 208. Cf. ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY: 
THE EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE 191–93 (1980) (proposing a “multiple 
advocacy” system for designing organizational systems of accountability, in which those at the 
top remain neutral while those from different subunits, governed by different routines, make 
competing proposals). 
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provide equally important tools for firm learning. Principal among 
these is interaction with others whose thought processes are not 
governed by the same culture or knowledge structures as the decision 
maker.209 Indeed, changes in decisionmakers’ “information 
environment” provide some of the most powerful sources of learning, 
whereas environmental stability impedes learning and encourages the 
ossification of routines.210 Thus, hiring new personnel unfamiliar with 
organizational routines—or even creating teams with representatives 
from different subunits within the firm—prompts changes in 
knowledge structures, whereas long tenures with an organization 
enhance the perceptual screens related to decisionmaking 
pathologies.211 
The strength of this organizational learning technique is reflected 
in the effects of firms’ participation in interorganizational 
relationships such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, and other 
networked affiliations.212 These are collaborations on which firms 
increasingly rely for adaptation and learning.213 These relationships 
form a locus of innovation precisely because the participants bring 
 
 209. See Heath et al., supra note 201, at 20 (“Often, organizations ensure that individuals 
weigh information effectively by forcing them to interact with others who might weigh the 
information differently.”); Walsh, supra note 117, at 291 (“[R]esearch on the process of 
knowledge structure development suggests that a dramatically altered information environment 
is often the locus of knowledge structure change.”). 
 210. Compare Jay W. Lorsch, Strategic Myopia: Culture as an Invisible Barrier to Change, in 
GAINING CONTROL OF THE CORPORATE CULTURE 84 (R.H. Kilmann et al. eds., 1985) 
(recommending job rotation across functional areas as an antidote to “strategic myopia”) and 
Ralph Katz, Managing Careers: The Influence of Job and Group Longevities, in CAREER ISSUES 
IN HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 154, 165 (1982) (same, as an antidote to “functional 
fixedness”), with Gordon Walker, Network Position and Cognition in a Computer Software 
Firm, 30 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 121 (1985) (finding that “industry veterans gradually failed to 
distinguish between the different ways of achieving short- and long-term goals”). See also Anil 
K. Gupta, Contingency Linkages Between Strategy and General Manager Characteristics: A 
Conceptual Examination, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 399, 406 (1984) (arguing that managers with 
functionally diverse career histories will make the greatest contribution to the firm). 
 211. Indeed this is the very problem that plagued the Nut Islanders. See supra text 
accompanying notes 154–58. 
 212. See, e.g., Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of 
Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116, 142 (1996) 
(discussing knowledge creation as the product of interorganizational relationships which are 
fluid and evolving, rather than intraorganizational ones that are tightly bound or static). 
 213. Id. at 119 (“A firm’s value and ability as a collaborator is related to its internal assets, 
but at the same time, collaboration further develops and strengthens those internal 
competencies.”); Christine M. Beckman & Pamela R. Haunschild, Network Learning: The 
Effects of Partners’ Heterogeneity of Experience on Corporate Acquisitions, 47 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
92, 97 (2002) (“[F]irms tend to learn more from outsiders than insiders.”). 
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different experiences, and therefore different knowledge structures, 
to the venture.214 Firms in strategic alliances “explore their 
experiences by collaborating with other organizations that are 
different enough to create variety in their experiences.”215 This 
exposure to experiential diversity, in turn, effects intrafirm changes, 
as “[t]he organization internalizes what has been jointly explored with 
other organizations.”216 By this process, the “[l]earning takes place as 
a transformation of exploration between organizations to exploration 
within the single organization.”217 
The pattern of learning through joint ventures underscores the 
type of external interactions that best promotes good internal 
decisionmaking. Such “networked” interactions involve collaborative, 
yet relatively discrete, relationships between firms and other wholly 
independent entities: entities who also pursue a variety of goals and 
projects unrelated to—and sometimes in direct competition with—
those of their partners. Their position external to the firm, but 
cooperating with it, places them in a position to serve a boundary-
spanning function.218 They serve as bridges to different ways of 
understanding situations and making decisions; they make visible by 
contrast routines that had remained unexamined within firm culture; 
and they call attention within the firm to external data points that can 
be used for benchmarking purposes.219 Moreover, because of their 
independence from the firm, the knowledge that outside partners 
 
 214. See, e.g. Beckman & Haunschild, supra note 213, at 93 (documenting the benefits of 
partner heterogeneity). 
 215. Mikael Holmkvist, A Dynamic Model of Intra- and Interorganizational Learning, 24 
ORG. STUD. 95, 112 (2003). 
 216. Id. See generally C. Marlene Fiol, Consensus, Diversity, and Learning in Organizations, 
5 ORG. SCI. 403 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of diversity in outlook on “the processes of 
modifying one’s ‘cognitive maps or understandings,’ thereby changing the range of one’s 
potential behaviors” (citation omitted)). 
 217. Holmkvist, supra note 215, at 112. 
 218. See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360 
(1973) (hypothesizing, in the context of social networks, that those with “weak ties” in the 
network provide a bridge between groups with “strong ties”); Mark S. Granovetter, The 
Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201 (1983) (reviewing the 
empirical studies testing the “weak ties” hypothesis); W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: 
RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND OPEN SYSTEMS 203–13 (5th ed. 2002) (discussing “Bridging 
Tactics,” in the context of “Boundary Setting and Boundary Spanning”). 
 219. See Andrew H. Gold et al., Knowledge Management: An Organizational Capabilities 
Perspective, 18 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 185 (2001) (discussing the use of collaboration and 
benchmarking to assesses the current state of organizational processes and to capture 
knowledge for use internally). 
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introduce within firm boundaries claims particular legitimacy among 
insiders across firm subunits.220 
The promise of a network structure for overcoming 
decisionmaking pathologies is demonstrated explicitly in studies of 
firms for whom the interest in accountable and reliable 
decisionmaking is paramount. These types of organizations, such as 
nuclear power plants, hospitals, and aircraft carriers, reflect particular 
sensitivity to the ways that efforts to simplify decisions can create 
irrational outcomes. They therefore promote the thoughtful pursuit 
of important goals by doing just the opposite: by making decision 
processes more complex. This is achieved by incorporating in decision 
structures a network of different actors and organizations with 
different viewpoints. In this model of “negotiated complexity,” formal 
and informal interorganizational agreements about how decisions are 
made are repeatedly renegotiated and renewed, ensuring that the 
homogeneity, specialization, and standardization that organizations 
usually develop in the interest of efficiency are supplemented by 
diversity, duplication, overlap, and a varied response repertoire, 
which promote substantive reliability.221 
3. Tools for Enhancing Accountability Through Review.  
Research into the psychology of accountability indicates that the 
review of firm behavior by entities whose monitoring criteria are both 
well specified and known to firm decisionmakers exacerbates the 
substitution of cognitive shortcuts for reasoned judgment, and 
promotes routinized “check the box” compliance.222 Yet that same 
research identifies ways in which review can be structured to 
“motivat[e] cognitive misers to be thoughtful.”223 Specifically, decision 
pathologies are mediated in situations in which decisionmakers do 
not know the socially “acceptable” response—or more precisely, 
when those decisionmakers need to explain themselves to others 
 
 220. See Tanya Menon & Jeffrey Pfeffer, Valuing Internal vs. External Knowledge: 
Explaining the Preference for Outsiders, 49 MGMT. SCI. 497, 505 (2003) (finding that managers 
prefer knowledge obtained from outsiders). 
 221. See Martin Landau & David Chisolm, The Arrogance of Optimism: Notes on Failure 
Avoidance Management, 3 J. CONTINGENCIES CRISIS MGMT. 67, 68 (1995) (discussing the 
differences in patterns needed for efficiency, and those needed for reliability); Paul R. 
Schulman, The Negotiated Order of Organizational Reliability, 25 ADMIN. & SOC. 353, 361–62 
(1993) (discussing negotiated reliability); Wieck et al., supra note 205, at 81. 
 222. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
 223. Tetlock, supra note 185, at 314. 
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whose views they do not know in advance. This type of accountability 
motivates people to become more vigilant, complex, and self-critical 
information processors.224 
In particular, such accountability “motivates people to consider 
arguments and evidence on both sides of issues in order to prepare 
themselves for a wide variety of critical reactions to their views.”225 It 
develops tolerance for cognitive inconsistency, so that a 
decisionmaker recognizes good features of rejected policies and bad 
features of accepted policies. It fosters a greater awareness of the 
cognitive processes underlying the decision. And finally, it counters 
the reliance on “existing knowledge structures in interpreting new 
information,” making decisionmakers more willing to revise initial 
impressions of the situation in response to changing evidence.226 
Incorporating this type of review into structures for monitoring the 
exercise of firm discretion, then, offers a useful tool for meaningful 
“cognitive accountability.” 
C. Learning from Organizational Learning: Three Administrative 
Law Approaches to Cognitive Accountability 
The combination of direct and indirect ways that external forces 
overcome decision pathologies that would otherwise thwart 
environmental influences offers a model for regulators. 
Decisionmakers can step outside existing knowledge structures when 
external stimuli prompt them to devote attention to particular 
situations they confront, to account for unexpected information, and 
to consider unfamiliar implications. They are particularly open to 
learning as part of a dialogue with outside organizations informed by 
different viewpoints—organizations that interact repeatedly but not 
constantly, so that each retains its independent culture, approach, and 
way of thinking. And these processes and interactions must not be 
isolated, but recurrant and developing, so that new patterns of 
decision resist ossification. In sum, internal firm decisionmaking is 
rendered more accountable by outside influence on decision 
processes and structural design. 
This indicates the possibility of influencing the substance of 
private firms’ exercise of regulatory discretion in ways familiar to 
 
 224. Id. at 314–21 (reviewing research evidence). 
 225. Id. at 316. 
 226. Id. 
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administrative law: process and structure. It further offers a renewed 
capacity for agencies to promote the exercise of delegated discretion 
in a rational manner constrained by public norms and amenable to 
outside review, while still drawing on firms’ superior knowledge 
about their internal workings. In light of the research on firm 
decisionmaking, promising features of existing regulation, examples 
of individual firm regulatory decisions, and innovative suggestions for 
regulatory design developed in other contexts, the following 
discussion suggests three specific accountability approaches that 
regulators might use to supplement existing control measures:  
(1) administrators can regulate the attention of decisionmakers 
directly; (2) they can promote networked decision processes that 
enhance accountability; and (3) administrative agencies can develop 
the capacity to participate in such decision processes themselves, 
enhancing their role as educators promoting firm learning. 
1. Directly Regulating the Decisionmakers’ Focus: Improving 
Accountability Through “Attention Regulation.”  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, the principal legislative response to a perceived wave of 
financial misconduct, focused on two primary areas: “enhancing 
disclosure and altering incentives to change behavior.”227 The first 
focus was intended to improve the transparency and accuracy of 
information provided to the market; the second sought better to align 
the incentives of firm actors and third-party gatekeepers with 
regulatory goals. The Act has been subject to a host of criticisms on 
both fronts. Scholars have argued both that the additional disclosures 
added no information above what was already available to investors, 
and that wrongdoers such as Enron had already satisfied many of the 
Act’s substantive requirements governing the independence of 
directors, audit committees, and auditors.228 Yet several aspects of the 
Act, and some early indications of the response among regulated 
firms, suggest its promise as a means of overcoming harmful cognitive 
 
 227. Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks at the 
Practicing Law Institute—SEC Speaks (Feb. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch022803cag.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2006). 
 228. Professor Roberta Romano developed an early comprehensive critique, rooted in the 
empirical literature, of Sarbanes-Oxley as “Quack Corporate Governance.” See Roberta 
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance 97–98, 
(Yale Univ. Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 04-37, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=596101 (arguing that the market had adjusted on its own to the information conveyed 
by opaque financial statements). 
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shortcuts in firm decisionmaking, and improving both rationality and 
responsiveness in the exercise of regulatory discretion. 
a. Improving Rationality and Responsiveness Through Attention 
Regulation.  The simplest way to overcome harmful cognitive 
shortcuts is by providing external shocks that direct individuals to 
devote their attention to, and feel responsible for, a particular 
decision. When those individuals hold a central position within the 
firm power structure, this direction of attention more easily translates 
into systemic avoidance of decisionmaking pathologies. Attention 
regulation, therefore, provides the most straightforward way for 
regulators to promote the mindful exercise of regulatory discretion. 
Section 404 of the Act229 mandates an annual evaluation of 
internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. It specifically 
requires, among other things, that management publish an assessment 
of, and vouch for, the effectiveness of these controls. Section 302 
further requires frequent reporting in periodic financial reports of any 
deficiencies in the internal controls.230 The SEC’s implementing rules 
require management to acknowledge its responsibility for the 
adequacy of the company’s internal control framework and 
procedures for financial reporting.231 The rules added new Item 308 to 
Regulation S-K, which requires that the company’s management 
include a report on the company’s “internal control over financial 
reporting” in its annual report filed with the SEC.232 The 
recommended revisions to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines 
would further define an “effective program to prevent legal 
violations” as one in which a specific “high-level” individual or 
individuals were identified as having overall program responsibility.233 
They would also require periodic reporting on the program to 
governing authorities by both those individuals and the people with 
day-to-day responsibility for the program.234 Indeed, the existing 
 
 229. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
 230. Id. § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241. 
 231. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274 (2003). 
 232. 17 C.F.R. § 210. 
 233. Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 
1417 PLI/CORP 219, 225 (2004). 
 234. Id. at 229. 
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Guidelines mandate periodic assessment of the efficacy of compliance 
systems, albeit without reporting requirements.235 
An organizational learning perspective suggests four important 
elements for promoting rationality and responsiveness in the 
enactment of these provisions of section 404, the implementing 
regulations, and in certain aspects of the corresponding proposed 
Guidelines. First, the high level of publicity surrounding the Act’s 
passage alone, and prominent enforcement efforts,236 suggests that it 
will draw decisionmakers’ attention on the issue of compliance as 
they consider “available” contextual factors that should guide their 
decisions. The prominence of the issue further strengthens the 
legitimacy of those parties within regulated firms—lawyers, 
compliance officers and others—who advocate more comprehensive 
attention to developing control systems, which facilitates integrating 
such systems into existing decision structures and enhances their 
effectiveness. 
Second, for the first time, the certification requirements of 
section 404, and the language of the proposed Guidelines, explicitly 
place responsibility for thinking about control systems on particular 
officers, who must articulate the reasoning behind choices made in 
structuring the programs and attest to their adequacy in public 
documents. 
Third, section 404, by targeting the attention of powerful officers, 
takes advantage of the fact that the benefits of mindful individual 
cognition can be leveraged by the relevant decisionmaker’s leadership 
role within the firm. 
Finally, by requiring periodic evaluations, the Act and the 
proposed Guidelines take steps to ensure that organizational learning 
processes repeat at distinct and episodic intervals (rather than adapt 
continuously). This is a demonstrated tool for preventing adaptive 
routines from masking decisionmaking flaws and increasing risks. 
This form of regulation, then, suggests a means for moving 
beyond ongoing debate as to which types of ex post liability best deter 
wrongdoing.237 Instead “attention regulation” aims to foster good 
 
 235. Id. at 220. 
 236. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc., Case No. 04 CV 2324 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2004) (charging individual defendants with, inter alia, false certifications 
under Sarbanes-Oxley), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18638.htm. 
 237. On this question see Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 51; James D. Cox, Private 
Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 
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decisions ex ante, by choosing to promote responsibility in 
predetermined officers, rather than threatening to assess blame 
amongst all involved individuals after failures have occurred. 
b. Improving Reviewability Through Attention Regulation.  The 
literature on organizational learning further suggests that the end 
product of these attention-focusing requirements—the public report 
assessing the company’s internal control—suggests additional promise 
for promoting accountability through improved reviewability, with 
attendant benefits for promoting the rational exercise of regulatory 
discretion. 
As discussed in Part II, the implementation of regulation most 
often evades review, because it occurs through structures and 
processes largely hidden within firm boundaries. The requirement 
that these structures be examined, explained and assessed has two 
effects. First, it promises to reveal at least the conscious and formal 
compliance processes to scrutiny by both markets and regulators for 
the first time. The internal control disclosures filed under section 302, 
which report “material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in 
internal controls,”238 display an encouraging degree of candor about 
structural factors typical of pathological decisionmaking such as 
communication blocks, poor segregation of duties, and corporate 
culture.239 
Second, the very process of reporting promotes the type of 
cognitive accountability that results from reviewability. Regulatory 
disclosure requirements, including those contained in Sarbanes-
Oxley, are usually justified in terms of empowering market or 
 
(Autumn 1997); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be 
Held Criminally Liable, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239 (2000); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic 
Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 
1345 (1982). 
 238. Internal Control Disclosures From September, COMPLIANCE WK., Oct. 12, 2004 (on file 
with the Duke Law Journal). 
 239. See, e.g., id. (“Companies continue to provide greater detail on problems identified 
during internal control assessment and testing phases.”); June 2005 Internal Control Report: All 
About Remediation, COMPLIANCE WK., July 6, 2005 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) 
(“Companies are describing extensive details about the measures undertaken to remediate 
internal control weaknesses . . . .”); 92 Internal Control Disclosures in August, COMPLIANCE 
WK., Sept. 8, 2004 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The number of August disclosures is 
the largest monthly number . . . this year . . . .”). 
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political actors by providing them with information.240 Yet regulatory 
disclosure requirements can motivate firm officers to step outside 
routinized mindsets, to consider alternatives and contrary evidence, 
and to defend their choices in light of a wide variety of responses. 
This can occur because individuals are forced to focus on, collect 
information about, and assess the effectiveness of internal controls in 
firm-specific contexts, and then to justify the choices to a variety of 
political and market actors whose views may be unknown. Mark 
Jensen, National Director for Venture Capital Services at Deloitte & 
Touche and a member of the SEC’s Advisory Committee for Smaller 
Companies, puts this even more strongly: “In thirty years as an 
auditor, the one thing I could point to that changed management’s 
behavior is 404. . . . [I]t created a sense of urgency on the part of 
senior executives in a company to take their financial reporting 
seriously.”241 Previously, he describes, he had trouble getting the 
attention of CFOs and CEOs: “I can’t tell you how many times as an 
auditor you ask to meet with the CEO and the CEO doesn’t want to 
meet with you, and yet they’re the person who ultimately . . . is 
responsible for what they’re telling the public. In some cases it’s even 
hard sometimes to get to the CFO, because especially in the late 90’s 
the CFOs many times w[ould] tell you: they’re ‘not accountants.’”242 
Not surprisingly, given the absence of thinking about cognitive 
accountability during its passage, Sarbanes-Oxley provides an 
incomplete model of attention regulation. Most notably, it fails to 
take advantage of a number of straightforward organizational 
learning tools geared toward overcoming decision pathologies. It 
could, for example, have required that internal control assessments 
compare yearly performance benchmarks, or explain alternatives 
considered and rejected. It could also have identified other types of 
information that must be taken account of in specific contexts, such as 
the Treasury Department’s requirement that regulated insurers 
consider a number of specific factors in a detailed risk assessment to 
comply with money-laundering statutes.243 Only more detailed 
 
 240. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: 
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999) (discussing those compelled disclosures that 
are meant to affect market responses and those meant to affect political responses). 
 241. Mark Jensen, Panel Presentation, Conference on Post-Enron Corporate Regulation: 
Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far (or Not Far Enough)? at the University of California at 
Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law (Mar. 17, 2006) (on file with the author). 
 242. Id. 
 243. 31 C.F.R. § 103.137 (2006). 
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analysis of Sarbanes-Oxley’s effects on internal cognition can 
illuminate fully the ways these changes have affected firm 
decisionmaking. 
Yet the combined effects of these and other section 404 
requirements on identifying and disclosing internal control 
efficiencies missed just months before Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
implementation,244 provide at least tentative support for the notion 
that the certification process (at least as a newly implemented 
requirement) can prompt thoughtful and accountable 
decisionmaking. In the words of one former CFO, “linking your name 
to the program really puts it on the front burner of what you’re 
thinking about.”245 
2. Encouraging Rationality, Responsiveness and Reviewability 
Through Boundary-Spanning Relationships: Diversifying the Third-
Party Monitor Model.  Knowledge structures both distort the 
incorporation of external regulatory goals within firm boundaries and 
diminish a firm’s responsiveness to the external organizations meant 
to monitor the firm’s pursuit of such goals. The literature on learning 
through exposure to different organizational cultures and mindsets 
suggests a framework for using firm interactions across boundaries to 
achieve the opposite: enhanced decision rationality and 
responsiveness. 
This account highlights two critical characteristics of successful 
interorganizational relations that differ from firms’ distorted relations 
with third-party or government monitors discussed in Part II.246 First, 
the relation is collaborative rather than adversarial. The perception 
that cross-boundary cooperation directly furthers organic corporate 
goals mediates intrafirm resistance to learning and the detrimental 
effect on creative thinking that arises from antagonistic monitoring. 
Participant firms are more open to the debiasing effects of external 
stimuli, just as they are to the wholly internal learning benefits 
accrued when new personnel are recruited who bring different 
experiences and cultural filters to decisionmaking. 
Second, firms participating in interorganizational partnerships 
remain what sociologist Karl Weick terms “loosely coupled,” in that 
 
 244. See infra notes 247–66 and accompanying text. 
 245. Telephone Interview with Stephen Tisdell, President, The Compliance Partners, in 
Nashville, Tenn. (Sept. 24, 2004). 
 246. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
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they are responsive to one another, but preserve their separateness 
and identity.247 Because of this characteristic, they often resist the 
cultural co-option that can affect auditors in a more tightly coupled 
relationship with the firm. Precisely because of their relative 
independence, other organizations in a network can disrupt intrafirm 
routines and improve decision structures by providing boundary-
spanning knowledge of contrasting experiences, cultures, mindsets, 
and habits. 
The model of loose coupling between “partners” in 
implementing regulation offers at least three lessons for structuring 
regulated firm accountability. 
First, it suggests the importance of reexamining and 
experimenting with the role of existing gatekeepers—another 
element of Sarbanes-Oxley. Section 404 of the Act requires the 
independent auditor who prepares or issues the audit report on 
financial statements attest to, and report on, the internal controls 
assessed by management.248 Thus, for the first time, third-party 
auditors are involved in making public assessments of internal 
decisionmaking processes and structures, in addition to substantive 
financial reporting. Such involvement provides two related types of 
accountability: (1) frequent input by an independent party about the 
rationality of decisionmaking structures and their public objectives—
as well as the attendant benefits of such review for prompting good 
decisionmaking; and (2) reporting to the general public by an actor 
(the auditor) with direct access to internal firm workings permitting a 
type of review generally unavailable to either regulators or the 
market. 
Data about the Act’s early effects indicate that section 404’s 
provisions show promise as examples of learning tools for regulatory 
design more generally. In 2005, the first full year of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
effectiveness, over 1,250 publicly held companies (of a total 15,000) 
disclosed material weaknesses in internal controls, while 1,200 
restated earnings. Earnings mismanagement, which pre-Sarbanes-
Oxley was “endemic, and not due to ‘a few bad apples,’” especially in 
poorly performing industries, “reversed abruptly” after the Act’s 
 
 247. Karl E. Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. 
Q. 1, 3 (1976). 
 248. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2000 & Supp. 2003); see also supra 
notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
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passage.249 And the biggest factor in 2005 restatements was errors 
discovered through section 404 compliance.250 
Most strikingly, 94 percent of companies that disclosed a 
“qualified” opinion as to the effectiveness of internal controls after 
the 404 deadline had certified them as effective as recently as the 
previous quarter.251 Prior to section 404’s effect, “thousands of 
executives made these claims with not only limited support, but 
contradictory evidence.”252 Control problems were discovered, 
however, once accountability tools—executive certification, auditor 
assessment and reporting requirements—were implemented. These 
discoveries arose independent of any change in the substantive 
financial disclosure regime. New studies, in turn, reflect positive 
effects on the market’s faith in the accuracy of Sarbanes-Oxley 
reporting.253 
This conclusion alone cannot indicate whether Sarbanes-Oxley 
itself is wise policy. A balancing of the potential benefits with the 
massive compliance costs imposed by the Act falls outside the scope 
of this Article.254 It does, however, suggest promising paths for future 
 
 249. Daniel A. Cohen, Aiyesha Dey & Thomas Lys, Trends in Earnings Management and 
Informativeness of Earnings Announcements in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods 
(Feb. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=658782). The Act’s 
efficacy as an attention-focusing measure was enhanced by highly publicized enforcement 
actions, which the authors of this study identify as a source of likely damping effect on 
opportunistic behavior. Id. 
 250. Melissa Klein Aguilar, Restatements Should Subside as 404, Lease Issues Fade, 
COMPLIANCE WK., Feb. 14, 2006 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (quoting Lynn Turner, 
former chief accountant of the SEC, and managing director of research, Glass Lewis & Co.). 
 251. See Leah Townsend & Mark Grulhe, Control Deficiencies—Finding Financial 
Impurities: Analysis of the 2004 and Early 2005 Deficiency Disclosures, CONTROL DEFICIENCIES 
TREND ALERT, June 24, 2005, at 1; Melissa Klein Aguilar, SOX 404 Deficiencies Preceded by 
“Effective” 302 Reports, COMPLIANCE WK. (July 26, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 252. Aguilar, supra note 251 (quoting Tim Leach, the chief methodology officer for Paisley 
Consulting). 
 253. Jeffrey Doyle et al., Determinants of Weaknesses in Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting and the Implications for Earnings Quality (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/accounting/seminars/McVay.pdf) (concluding that the existence 
of a material weakness per se results in lower earnings quality); Jacqueline S. Hammersley et al., 
Market Reactions to the Disclosure of Internal Control Weaknesses and to the Characteristics 
of Those Weaknesses Under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Oct. 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=830848) (finding that returns are 
significantly negative when material weaknesses are disclosed, and more negative when 
management claims that the control system is effective, despite the presence of a material 
weakness). 
 254. See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too 31 (Harv. L. & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 
01__BAMBERGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:06 PM 
2006] REGULATION AS DELEGATION 455 
experimentation and research about the ways in which a host of 
private actors with whom firms are already used to sharing 
information about internal firm workings—from accountants to 
insurers—might be enlisted to improve decisionmaking. 
Second, the loose coupling/partners model points to the 
importance of enhancing regulatory-gatekeeper independence—a 
theme evident in recent corporate law scholarship. This literature 
focuses largely on remedying the skewed financial incentives that can 
compromise the monitoring function. Certainly, the elimination of 
economic inducements that create conflicts of interest provides an 
essential component for ensuring independent gatekeeper judgment. 
Additionally, it ameliorates some of the cognitive forces that skew 
behavior, such as the self-serving bias that renders auditors 
vulnerable to distorted firm mindsets. Yet an organizational behavior 
understanding further urges policymakers explicitly to assess whether 
proposals will enhance the structural and cultural independence of 
third-party regulatory actors, as a means of spurring better 
decisionmaking in the firms they monitor. This organizational lens, 
for example, suggests the merit of simple requirements that firms 
rotate auditors,255 and more sweeping reforms that would strengthen 
the cultural independence that auditors as a group could bring to the 
table.256 
Third and finally, the model of responsive learning counsels 
experimentation with—combined with systemic and empirical 
 
525, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=808244 (calculating the aggregate compliance 
costs for American firms at $35 billion). The compliance burden is particularly great for small 
firms. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Eric Talley, Going-Private Decisions and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/talley_012306.pdf) (providing evidence that Sarbanes-Oxley is 
driving small firms to exit the public capital markets). 
 255. See, e.g., Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor 
Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release No. 47,265, Public 
Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,642, Investment Company Act Release No. 
25,915, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2103, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm (describing how rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley 
§ 203 provide that an accounting firm will not be independent if either the lead audit partner or 
the concurring partner performs audit services for more than five consecutive fiscal years of an 
audit client). 
 256. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational 
Intermediaries, Auditor Independence, and the Governance of Accounting (Colum. L. Sch., Ctr. 
for L. & Econ. Stud. Working Paper No. 191, 2001) (proposing establishment of self-regulation 
structure within the accounting profession as a means of developing self-discipline), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=270994. 
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analysis of—the formal involvement of novel types of third parties 
into regulatory implementation networks.  
Insurers offer one promising paradigm for third-party 
involvement in regulatory networks. Because insurers possess 
significant data on risk across firms and industry sectors, they offer an 
independent perspective on risks that may be missed by those internal 
to any individual firm’s mindset. Moreover, insurers’ historical 
practice of encouraging (by premium pricing), or requiring (as a 
condition of coverage), risk-reduction measures on the part of 
insureds257 offers an example of third-party involvement distinct from 
the usual antagonistic monitoring model.  
The activities of the Ethics Resource Center (ERC) provide a 
second model for experimentation.258 The ERC is a nonprofit 
compliance and ethics promotion organization which publishes the 
biannual “National Business Ethics Survey” (NBES),259 a publicly 
available survey of over 150,000 workers across industry. The survey 
compiles, in a detailed manner, data on employee experiences with 
risk assessment, misconduct, values, reporting, and compliance 
systems in firms. The ERC also consults with firms seeking to 
evaluate their own compliance and ethics systems. It conducts similar 
surveys within those individual companies, the data from which can 
be compared to the NBES benchmark, as well as against benchmark 
surveys performed previously within the same firm. Over the years, 
ERC clients have included two-thirds of the corporations in the 
Standard & Poor’s Global 100 Index. 
ERC’s paradigm suggests a number of ways in which third-party 
networks can help overcome internal decisionmaking pathologies’ 
subversion of regulatory norms. First, the cooperative nature of the 
relationship between the firm and the nonprofit permits access to 
large number of employees working at various levels of the firm. Such 
access can unearth types of information otherwise unavailable to 
 
 257. PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
THROUGH INSURANCE 24 (1997) (“The insurer, taking a cue from the nineteenth century 
mutual companies, will often require its potential policyholders to undertake specific loss 
reduction activities before receiving insurance coverage. In fact, insurance companies have 
often been the driving force behind the implementation of safety procedures.”). 
 258. Information on the Ethics Resource Center comes from Telephone Interview with Pat 
Harned, Acting President, Ethics Res. Ctr., in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 13, 2004), and Telephone 
Interview with Cherie Raven, Analyst, Ethics Res. Ctr., in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 27, 2004). The 
details of the defense contractor example come from the Raven interview. 
 259. ETHICS RES. CTR., NATIONAL BUSINESS ETHICS SURVEY 2005. 
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either outside regulators or third-party monitors performing an audit 
function.  
Second, ERC’s collection of external benchmarks gives it the 
ability to direct firm decisionmakers to consider information that they 
had previously missed. This information, in turn, may make visible 
the structural and perceptual decisionmaking pathologies prevalent in 
their firm. An ERC survey of a large defense contractor, for example, 
revealed—despite the company’s technical legal compliance with 
filing and other formal requirements—a relatively high percentage of 
employees observing what they feared constituted misconduct or 
other compliance problems (56 percent), but a comparatively low 
level of reporting up the line. The survey’s detailed questions 
discovered that, although coworkers felt strong trust between one 
another, they lacked trust that supervisors would take complaints 
seriously, that they would be believed, and that firm routines and 
systems actually reflected the articulated emphasis on ethical 
reporting over performance measures. 
Third, ERC’s relations with firms are structured so as to leverage 
the impact of its findings. Not only does the nonprofit consult from 
the position of an outsider, it also seeks to maximize the perceived 
legitimacy of its advice by working only for senior officers with 
firmwide management responsibility. These two elements provide 
means to avoid the phenomenon by which similar concerns voiced 
internally may be devalued as reflecting the internal politics of one 
department, such as human resources or “legal.” 
The power of network relationships between loosely coupled 
organizations, each informed by different cultures and knowledge 
structures, is suggested more broadly by Susan Sturm’s study of 
corporate compliance in the employment discrimination context.260 
Although Professor Sturm’s research does not explicitly focus on 
social cognition, it discusses attempts to address “second generation 
manifestations of workplace bias”261—bias which results not from 
overt discrimination, but from firm-specific patterns of behavior that 
are in many ways similar to the decision procedures and knowledge 
frameworks discussed here. This type of bias, she describes, is also not 
readily susceptible to rule-based regulation and monitoring. 
Externally developed rules, general enough to apply across firms, will 
 
 260. Sturm, supra note 15, at 492–519. 
 261. Id. at 460. 
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not “be sufficiently sensitive to context or integrated into the day-to-
day practice that shapes their implementation.”262 Success in shaping 
firm behavior, as evidenced by a number of case studies she presents, 
derives instead in large part from the participation of “[a] set of 
intermediate actors, operating within and across the boundaries of 
workplaces.”263 These intermediaries—professionals like lawyers, 
human resource specialists, and compliance consultants, as well as 
other interested parties such as unions and insurers—each belong to 
“broader communit[ies] of practice.”264 They bring different sets of 
norms to problem solving, provide pooled information about best 
practices and the behavior of different organizations, and can 
introduce external benchmarking techniques into firm 
decisionmaking. Together, they “foster[] the development of hybrid 
forms of relationships between public and private norms, legal and 
informal incentives, and contextual and general learning.”265 With the 
participation of these mediating institutions, the employers Sturm 
studied were able to “self-consciously design[] or revis[e] their 
systems of conflict resolution and problem solving to address their 
particular culture, power dynamics, and patterns of daily 
interaction.”266 
Consistent with companies’ market response of developing 
networks to improve the effective implementation of legal mandates, 
established patterns of organizational learning suggest that regulators 
might enhance the responsiveness of firm decisionmaking by 
involving other capable but independent market actors in networks of 
accountability. 
3. Encouraging Responsiveness and Reviewability Through the 
Agency-Firm Relationship: Agencies as Educators.  Finally, an 
organizational approach challenges regulators to conceive of ways to 
restructure their interactions with regulated firms to promote 
accountability in the exercise of regulatory discretion. As discussed in 
Part II,267 the natural pattern by which regulator and regulated 
develop shared understandings of compliance can lead to routinized 
 
 262. Id. at 475–76. 
 263. Id. at 523. 
 264. Id. at 522–36 (discussing different intermediaries). 
 265. Id. at 537. 
 266. Id. at 519. 
 267. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
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behavior on the part of each, hindering the very exercise of 
independent firm judgment that regulatory delegation seeks to 
initiate. Indeed, a regulator-firm relationship in which agencies and 
firms reach a static accord constitutes a paradigmatic example of 
single-loop learning, with all of its strengths and weaknesses. The 
unitary burst of mutual feedback typical of a regulatory rulemaking 
process, for example, may spur the attentive development of 
compliance routines. But without repeated interactions, it can lead to 
cognitive complacency that masks insufficiencies over time. The 
literature on social cognition and firm behavior challenges regulators 
to develop double-loop learning techniques that prompt both parties 
to make mindful decisions over time. 
Sarbanes-Oxley, not surprisingly, rates poorly in this respect. The 
SEC’s rules implementing section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley, for 
example, are both general and static. They require only that 
management base its evaluation of the effectiveness of the company’s 
internal controls on a suitable, recognized control framework that is 
established by a body or group that has followed due process 
procedures, and that the framework be distributed for public 
comment.268 The rules do not mandate the use of a particular 
framework, but explicitly identify the one established by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (commonly known as COSO) as satisfying the SEC’s 
criteria.269 Although these rules, by requiring general control 
structures developed after public comment, nod in the direction of 
the administrative law norm of public responsiveness, the COSO 
framework contains few specifics to promote the rational exercise of 
firm discretion. The framework generally requires oversight of 
financial reporting by the board and an audit committee, highlights 
good accounting standards, and emphasizes the importance of 
“management philosophy and operating style,”270 but in the end, it 
provides few additional means for achieving its recommendation that 
“[p]ublic companies should maintain internal controls that provide 
 
 268. See, e.g., Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor 
Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release No. 47,265, Public 
Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,642, Investment Company Act Release No. 
25,915, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2103, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm. 
 269. Id. at 6013. 
 270. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 
34 (1987). 
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reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial reporting will be 
prevented or subject to early detection.”271 
The 2003 prosecutorial guidelines concerning internal controls 
released jointly by the Department of Justice and the SEC at least 
suggest the importance of dynamic firm decisionmaking.272 They link 
compliance with general criteria implicated by decision pathologies, 
such as the prevailing corporate culture, and whether a company has 
a “responsive and evolving” compliance program under the 
supervision of upper-level management.273 
The question is how agencies can provide guidance as to the 
contours of a “responsive and evolving” program without reverting to 
the static prescriptions like the COSO framework. The lessons of 
organizational learning suggest that, without abandoning their 
traditional functions as rulemakers and enforcers, agencies might 
enhance their own role as a loosely coupled participant in a learning 
network with regulated firms. Indeed, if top-down control techniques 
are insufficient in light of systemic firm decisionmaking pathologies, 
and the articulation of compliance requirements is similarly 
compromised in promoting the exercise of bottom-up firm judgment, 
then perhaps these approaches can be supplemented by side-to-side 
involvement by regulators participating in networked accountability 
relationships. While this suggestion merits more comprehensive 
analysis beyond this Article’s scope, several approaches in regulatory 
practice and scholarly literature hint at the direction that research 
might take. 
a. Learning from Incomplete Starts.  Steps have been taken in 
this direction, both through experimentation with more cooperative 
models of regulation and through the individualized arrangements 
put into place by settlement agreements following enforcement 
actions. Both of these contexts provide suggestions for reconceiving 
the agency-firm accountability relationship, although they do not 
provide fully replicable models for across-the-board implementation. 
Through regulatory negotiation schemes, for example, agencies 
have negotiated the very content of administrative rules with 
 
 271. Id. at 33. 
 272. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Regarding 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf. 
 273. See id. 
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regulated parties.274 The “enforced self-regulation,” model associated 
with Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite more generally sets forth a 
paradigm in which individual firms develop self-regulation schemes, 
which are reviewed and approved by regulators individually, and then 
enforced against firms in the same way as governing law generally.275 
Indeed, the SEC has emphasized that the “hallmark” of internal 
controls are firm-specific “written policies and procedures,”276 and 
could enhance its involvement and review of these documents 
accordingly. 
Regulatory negotiation addresses some of the accountability 
problems of firm decisionmaking. Specifically, cooperative models 
link regulatory design to the type of firm-specific information often 
unavailable to regulators, but necessary for effective regulation. They 
further mediate some of the distortive effects of decisionmaking 
pathologies on regulatory inputs, like the damage that monitoring can 
do to the intrinsic motivation to comply with the law, and the adverse 
response to rules imposed externally.277 
Yet although these approaches provide some depth to the 
accountability toolbox,278 they do not specifically address the breadth 
of behavioral problems that distort the decisions delegated to 
regulated parties.279 Because regulatory negotiation is often a single-
 
 274. See Freeman, Collaborative Governance, supra note 12, at 33–35; Philip J. Harter, 
Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 42–112 (1982) (proposing a detailed 
“reg-neg” process largely adopted by the Administrative Council of the United States). 
 275. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 179, at 101–32. 
 276. Lori A. Richards, Speech at the Investment Company Institute/Independent Directors 
Council Mutual Fund Compliance Programs Conference, The New Compliance Rule: An 
Opportunity for Change (June 28, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch063004lar.htm. 
 277. See supra note 179 (discussing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation); Cunningham, supra 
note 169, at 294 (discussing how framing monitoring as cooperation is a “deliberate 
reorientation[] of the trust-suspicion model of internal controls”). 
 278. At the same time, others have noted, these approaches create other accountability 
problems. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis for Regulatory Policy?, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY 
INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 93, 97–98 (Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere 
eds., 2001) (criticizing the shift in power from accountable government administrators to private 
parties). 
 279. Moreover, even supporters of the collaborative model recognize the limited situations 
in which it can be applied. See, e.g., Freeman, Private Role, supra note 12, at 652–53 (discussing 
the “fragile conjunction of ingredients” on which the success of audited self-regulation rests, 
such as strong stakeholder representatives, shared understandings among stakeholders, and 
intensive agency involvement with the process of implementation). See generally Parker, supra 
note 23, at 542 (citing many individual self-regulation schemes that “have been shown to have 
01__BAMBERGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:06 PM 
462 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:377 
shot event, it alone cannot address the cognitive frames, routinized 
responses, and systemic pulls to myopic judgment that shape both 
organizational behavior generally and the implementation of legal 
norms more specifically. Indeed, by definition, even enforced self-
regulation ultimately rests on external monitoring. Its reliance on ex 
post audit diminishes the model’s ability to curb decisionmaking 
pathologies before they occur, and requires an assessment of 
decisions by third parties without meaningful access to the routines 
buried deep within a firm’s decision structures.280 
The benefits of enforced self-regulation are preserved, and the 
shortcomings diminished, in settlement agreements reached after 
initiation of an enforcement action. In these instances, agencies have 
the leverage to work on an ongoing basis to ensure that they remain 
part of a continuing dialogue with errant regulated parties seeking to 
reconstruct internal processes to better comply with legal mandates. 
The agreement entered earlier this year by the SEC and Warnaco, 
Inc., for example, required that the company hire an independent 
third-party consultant to perform a complete review of firm inventory 
systems, internal audit, financial reporting and other accounting 
functions, and required that the company adopt the recommendations 
of the independent consultant within 180 days.281 Other settlements 
 
failed”); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for 
Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 413 (2000) (suggesting that collaborative 
approaches be limited to “a facility-by-facility basis, in situations characterized by participants 
who form a community of individuals with some common interests, and in which those 
participants who represent the interests of stakeholders in the regulatory process are 
accountable to those stakeholders”). 
 280. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 61, at 74 (discussing the ways in which a system that 
sanctions firms for having poor compliance systems and gives bonuses for having good ones 
“necessarily means that a fact-finder has to make a reasonableness determination with respect 
to any given system”); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints 
on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 452 (1999) (noting, in the context of ex post 
review of agency decisions by experts, that “[g]enerally, it is difficult for an agency or an 
external monitor to know when use of a norm is justified”). 
 281. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Settlement with Warnaco, Former Warnaco 
Executives, and PwC for Financial Disclosure Violations (May 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-62.htm. 
Settlements involving environmental violators have reflected particular creativity. In the 
case of Balzers Corporation of Hudson, New Hampshire, for example, the EPA agreed that a 
regulatory fine could either be paid directly to the government or used toward capital 
improvements that reduced pollution. The firm chose the latter option, which involved 
integrating the plant process development staff into the environmental compliance structure. 
Together the integrated team discovered that it could reduce the costs of cleaning optical 
components, semiconductors, and compact discs by as much as $100,000 per year—as well as 
01__BAMBERGER.DOC 12/19/2006  5:06 PM 
2006] REGULATION AS DELEGATION 463 
have more explicitly involved placing agents approved by the SEC, 
such as former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, within the firm to 
supervise compliance implementation.282 
These examples, however, cannot be reproduced directly as a 
universal model for SEC regulation. Outside the enforcement 
context, agencies neither wield the power nor claim the resources 
necessary to work with regulated firms so intensively and individually. 
However, in their focus on actors inside the firm and on dynamic 
agency involvement in firm-specific compliance, individual 
settlements suggest tools that might be reproduced more broadly. 
b. A More Sustainable Model—Double Agents and Agency 
Educators.  The tools of organizational learning, the model of 
networked decisionmaking, and the partial successes of the 
negotiated and settlement models, suggest a two-track paradigm for 
agency action as a loosely coupled participant in developing 
responsive and evolving compliance programs. 
First, agencies can take advantage of the professionalization of 
compliance to cultivate “double agents” within firms, boundary-
spanning carriers who can bring independent mindsets to bear during 
firm decisionmaking. Certainly, the SEC cannot place a Richard 
Breeden within each firm’s boundaries. Yet it can consciously exploit 
the general counsel in each firm, and increasingly, the professional 
compliance officer. Agencies can nurture agents inside the firm who 
can help mitigate systemic decisionmaking pathologies through a 
variety of means: nurturing relations with professional compliance 
organizations as it does with the American Bar Association, 
increasing public awareness and education in ways that accord 
compliance officers greater legitimacy within the firm, and 
 
achieve significant environmental improvement—by switching technologies from a Freon-based 
to a water-based system. Because established structural arrangements within the firm did not 
allow for a compliance strategy with process department input, the potential for mutual gain 
was not previously explored. See Max H. Bazerman & Andrew J. Hoffman, Sources of 
Environmentally Destructive Behavior: Individual, Organizational, and Institutional Perspectives, 
21 RES. ORG. BEHAV., 39, 49 (1999). 
 282. See, e.g., Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden to Supervise Distribution of SEC’s 
Civil Penalty Against WorldCom, SEC Litigation Release No. 18451 (Nov. 10, 2003), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18451.htm; Christopher Traulsen, RS Funds: 
Proceed with Caution, MORNINGSTAR REPORTS, Oct. 30, 2004, http://advisor.morningstar.com/ 
articles/doc.asp?s=1&docId=3841&pgNo=1 (describing, as part of the settlement, the departure 
of the former CFO, the hiring of new COO Terry Otton, and the transfer of certain compliance 
oversight functions to him for twelve months). 
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establishing regular lines of communication with individual 
compliance officers. Indeed, in the summer of 2004 the SEC explicitly 
announced, in light of the mutual fund scandals, a new compliance 
rule grounded on the repeated premise that the Commission “will 
look to the Chief Compliance Officer as [its] ally.”283 In the words of 
Lori Richards, Director of the Office of Compliance Inspections and 
Examinations, “[W]e will develop that alliance—we will speak often 
to the Chief Compliance Officer, utilizing her knowledge to more 
completely understand the fund’s compliance program, to hear 
concerns, and to understand emerging issues and the ways in which 
they are being handled.”284 
Director Richards’ comments suggest a more general role for 
agencies as educators. Through periodic, but rather informal, 
communication with firms, regulators can regularly update their 
understandings of compliance challenges, and the ways in which such 
challenges are overcome in heterogeneous environments. They can 
then incorporate these lessons in evolving understandings of 
compliance and communicate them back to firms, counseling when 
appropriate about ways they may be adapted locally. This model 
draws in important ways on the “Democratic Experimentalism”285 
approach explored by Charles Sabel and Michael Dorf. Reflecting 
that approach, agencies could take advantage of their vantage point 
on the behavior of multiple firms to develop “rolling best practices” 
by collecting data from regulated entities about what works and what 
does not, and then disseminating that information back, through 
education and capacity building.286 Understood in terms of 
organizational learning, a central job of administrative agencies in this 
model would be to collect, and then to focus the attention of firm 
managers on, different ways of thinking about problems. This serves 
as a means of both learning about alternate approaches and making 
visible the assumptions and structures governing existing firm 
practice. As the “rolling” process repeats, firms are periodically 
 
 283. Richards, supra note 276. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314–23 (1998). 
 286. Id. at 350; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen et al., After Backyard Environmentalism: 
Toward a Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
692, 692–709 (2000) (providing, in the environmental context, a model in which administrative 
agencies develop the architecture for gathering and analyzing information across local contexts 
as a part of the regulatory and education process). 
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confronted with performance standards that “are continually 
ratcheted up as local experimentation reveals what is possible.”287 
Professors Sabel and Dorf’s pathbreaking work focuses on 
developing and exploring bottom-up voluntary solutions to 
governance problems, and largely concerns ways that public 
institutions can improve information flows to and from local 
experimenters. Its primary inquiry, however, is not the accountability 
of local decisionmakers. 
The challenge, then, is to develop ways to include a multiplicity 
of accountability tools in agency-educator experiments. The 
experimentalist model itself combines some of negotiated regulation’s 
strengths in tailoring local responsiveness to public norms with the 
direct dialogue benefits of the settlement paradigm. Yet its priority is 
not the reviewability component—the “accountable to whom?” 
element—that provides the impetus for permitting the regulator 
privileged access inside the firm in the first place. Both negotiated 
regulation and settlements, it might be said, are characterized not just 
by cooperation, but by cooperation “in the shadow” of enforcement. 
Thus, attempts to develop analogous broader-based models should 
draw not only on the agency’s vantage point on the comparative 
practices of other firms, but on the agency’s ability to leverage 
enforcement threats as a means to bargain for cooperative 
engagement. 
Two regulatory initiatives suggest such models, although both 
are nascent. The first, the Customs Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary port security initiative premised 
on the cooperation of private U.S. and select Mexican companies.288 
The program provides streamlined processes, as opposed to 
burdensome security enforcement, for firms that meet certain security 
minima, including “attention regulation” requirements that certain 
managers be actively involved in developing and implementing 
security measures. The program, for example, contains a requirement 
that CEOs and corporate boards review security measures 
 
 287. Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 384, 399 (2002). 
 288. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTAINER SECURITY: EXPANSION OF KEY 
CUSTOMS PROGRAMS WILL REQUIRE GREATER ATTENTION TO CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
9 (2003); U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism 
(C-TPAT): Partnership to Secure the Supply Chain, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/import/ 
commercial_enforcement/ctpat (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (U.S. Customs Service website 
containing resources related to program). 
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periodically, approve them, and remedy deficiencies that may exist.289 
Customs then shares the best practices of these firms with other C-
TPAT firms, including them in requirements for streamlined security 
burdens.290 
The second example, analyzed by Paul Schwartz and Edward 
Janger as an example of the experimentalism model,291 involves the 
“Interagency Guidance” implementing Title V of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act regarding data security breaches.292 The Guidance requires 
customer notice in cases of a reasonable likelihood of “misuse” of 
leaked personal information—a disclosure that can result in 
extremely costly reputational and monetary damages.293 But the 
Guidance also provides for a “second track,” providing for disclosure 
to the financial institution’s supervisory regulatory agency for a lower 
level security breach: when a reasonable likelihood exists of 
“unauthorized access” to the data. Thus Chief Privacy Officers are 
given an initial “opportunity” (albeit mandated) to open the doors of 
the firm to the regulator to “assess the effectiveness of an institution’s 
response plan”294 before the decision regarding public disclosure is 
reached. Regulators are thus provided with internal information, 
involved in overseeing the critical decision regarding disclosure, and 
given “an opportunity to consider steps other than notice to help 
mitigate the harm caused by the breach.”295 
Neither C-TPAT nor the GLB Interagency Guidance offer 
perfect models for broader restructuring of agency-firm relations. The 
C-TPAT, in its implementation, has fallen short in assessments of its 
success in providing effective review.296 The Guidance, like the 
 
 289. See, e.g., U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY BEST 
PRACTICES CATALOG, CUSTOMS-TRADE PARTNERSHIP AGAINST TERRORISM 4 (2006), 
available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ctpat/ctpat_ 
best_practices.ctt/ctpat_best_practices.pdf. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 33. 
 292. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer 
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 293. See generally Dominique Levin, Compliance—Burden or Opportunity?, SARBANES-
OXLEY COMPLIANCE J., Mar. 23, 2006, available at http://www.s-ox.com/feature/detail. 
cfm?articleID=1688 (calculating possible costs of remediation, legal risk and “brand damage” at 
$5–20 million per incident). 
 294. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer 
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,752. 
 295. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 33, at 23. 
 296. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 288. 
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settlement agreement examples it resembles, is only triggered after a 
regulatory failure. Yet they—as well as nascent moves like New 
Jersey’s announced intent to make chemical facility security best 
practices collected by state regulators mandatory—do suggest ways in 
which agencies, acting as the ultimate “double-loop” educator, can 
promote the exercise of regulatory discretion consistent with public 
norms. By learning in an ongoing manner about tools that are 
effective in offsetting decision pathologies—such as particular uses of 
benchmarking and other data to assess the effectiveness of control 
systems—and incorporating those insights into guidance for firms, 
they can better promote the rational exercise of regulatory discretion. 
By providing a different cultural filter for looking at specific 
regulatory problems in discussions with compliance officers, or 
communicating effective ways in which other firms have cooperated 
with external organizations like insurers or industry groups, they can 
improve responsiveness to regulatory goals. And by embracing 
evolving, rather than static, understandings about compliance, they 
may be able to avoid the traps of “check the box” compliance, 
prompting mindful thinking processes through review, and enhancing 
accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
The delegation of decisionmaking to regulated parties presents a 
conundrum. Regulators need to rely on private actors to assess and 
manage risk. The costs of failure are significant, in terms of harm to 
specific individuals, injury to faith in markets, and risk to persons and 
property more generally. 
At the same time, the structure of firm-specific decisions does 
not lend itself to regulation by top-down command; nor do regulators 
have a clear yardstick by which to assess firms’ bottom-up efforts at 
governance. Such delegation, then, in the words of one prominent 
administrative law scholar, “misleads us into thinking that the firm is 
being supervised or controlled, while in actuality it can violate 
applicable public norms with impunity.”297 
By integrating a public accountability approach with 
understandings of decisionmaking in the private sector, this Article 
provides a starting point for research in thinking about these issues. 
Incorporating organizational learning approaches into regulatory and 
 
 297. Rubin, supra note 83, at 2109. 
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agency design offers a means to spur more rational, responsive, and 
accountable decisionmaking without having to rely exclusively on the 
imperfect and costly tools of monitoring and punishment. Moreover 
such approaches offer the potential to improve the efficacy of internal 
control processes on which firms are already expending substantial 
resources. 
In proposing a suite of accountability tools, this Article looks to 
research on individual judgment and organizational behavior. In so 
doing, it focuses scholarly attention on the cognitive dimension of 
existing regulatory structures, to ensure that social cognition will be 
considered when developing future policy. It then sketches three 
contexts in which this cognitive dimension might be brought to bear. 
This blueprint is intended to provide direction for empirical analysis 
that can indicate the relative successes and costs of such policy 
approaches. The hope is that policymakers in a host of contexts in 
which risk plays a role, will be armed not only with accurate 
information about the costs of requirements intended to guide the 
exercise of regulatory discretion, but also information about their 
efficacy in promoting the accurate and accountable implementation 
of public goals. 
